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I speak amazedly, and it becomes
My marvel and my message.
The Winter’s Tale V.i.189-90

interea medium Aeneas iam classe tenebat
certus iter fluctusque atros Aquilone secabat
moenia respiciens, quae iam infelicis Elissae
conlucent flammis. quae tantum accenderit ignem
causa latet.
Aeneid 5.1-5
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Preface
Even the briefest survey of Shakespeare’s canon will show that the playwright’s methods of
representing time are nearly as great in number as the plays themselves—if not even greater, as a
single play might have multiple apparent systems of time: for example, Othello, the most
commonly cited of these, has been described as possessing a “double time-structure,” split
between what is necessary for the action and what is implied by the dialogue.1 Each particular
representation of time carries with it generic expectations alongside the possibility for the
deferral of those expectations, what Katharine Maus calls “troubling departures from the norm.”2
As early in the canon as Love’s Labor’s Lost, (written sometime before 1598), Shakespeare was
experimenting with his audience’s perception of the time-scale of the action they are witnesses to.
As the play comes to a close, the lords of Navarre abruptly find themselves dealing with
deferred expectations—narratological as well as erotic. In a strikingly self-aware exchange, Lord
Biron (in a rare public display of sincerity) expresses his sense of denial in a metatheatrical
complaint.
BIRON

Our wooing doth not end like an old play:
Jack hath not Jill; these ladies’ courtesy
Might well have made our sport a comedy.

KING

Come, sir; it wants a twelvemonth and a day,
And then ‘twill end.

BIRON

That’s too long for a play.
V.ii.2817-21

Biron connects the fulfillment of generic expectations, as well as validation of the time spent
attending (or being a character in) a play, to the attaining of certain foreseen goals. Upon

1

Sproule, Albert Frederick. “A Time Scheme for Othello,” in Shakespeare Quarterly, 7.2 (1956), 217-226.

2

Maus, Katharine Eisaman. “Shakespearean Comedy,” in The Norton Shakespeare, 2009. 106-7.
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knowing that we are going to see a comedy, we will expect to witness (according to Biron) both
the separation of “Jack” and “Jill” figures and their reunion. Both the origin of the situation and
its resolution must be timely; we have neither the patience nor the theatrical resources to
represent “a twelvemonth and a day.” King Ferdinand, replying in the context of actual life
outside the theater, is seemingly much less aware than Biron of his own status as an actor, who
senses that if his desires’ fulfillment are deferred beyond the limits of theatrical representation,
they are in effect lost to him entirely.
What happened between the years of 1598 and 1611 to account for the tectonic shift in timestructures from comedies such as Biron’s to late plays such as The Winter’s Tale? In the latter
work, Time Personified enters after the drama has run half its course, and asks for our
cooperation.
Impute it not a crime
To me or my swift passage that I slide
O’er sixteen years and leave the growth untried
Of that wide gap, since it is in my power
To o’erthrow law, and in one self-born hour
To plant and o’erwhelm custom…
I turn my glass, and give my scene such growing
As you had slept between.
IV.i.4-17

As spectators of Love’s Labor’s Lost we found ourselves thwarted by the limits of theatrical
representation; here in this later play, we are asked to suspend our disbelief during a leap of not
only Ferdinand’s “twelvemonth and a day” but a full sixteen years. Ricardo Quinones writes that
comedy has a way of constantly thwarting our expectations of time-structure, noting
aphoristically that “there is no clock in the forest of Arden.”3 But the later plays, commonly
dubbed romance, do not adopt their time-forms out of carelessness for their characters or
spectators, as Quinones seems to imply about the earlier comedies. Indeed, Time is a principal
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Quinones, Ricardo J. The Renaissance Discovery of Time. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. p. 413.
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theme among the last plays, and each one is carefully planned to reflect differing aspects of its
passage. The Tempest is particularly eloquent in this respect, as it says the most about time and
how we perceive it while taking up the least temporal space—by far—of any play in the canon.
The Tempest is a play with many voices. Every play is comprised of voices, but the texture of
the exchanges in The Tempest gives it a unique and inimitable style. The play does not silence
the dissonance that arises from its many contending voices and contending accounts of the play’s
hidden past. Out of its peculiar situation in time, the play can be analyzed in ways which others
in the canon either could not stand up to or through which they could not yield anything of note.
Viewing The Tempest through the lens of epic poetry, with an eye on the operation of time in and
around the play can yield insights into the play’s antecedents, the perspectives of its characters,
and its outlook on the world.
This project, concerned with memory, storytelling, narration, and language, is divided into
three parts. First, we examine the nature of epic narratives, storytelling across distance, and both
the characteristics and the complications present in the form as represented in The Tempest and
one of its models, Virgil’s Aeneid. Second, we examine language, the fundamental building
block of storytelling, and its significance as a microcosm of the whole system of narrative in the
play. Third, we examine the point towards which these aspects of storytelling tend as well as
alternatives to oral retelling in the last plays. In conclusion, we take all these forms of accounts
together and look with a widening perspective on memory in the canon, inside and outside of
The Tempest.
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Chapter 1
“As over a vast”

The presentation of time in The Tempest stands alone in the Shakespearean canon. No other
play takes place in one single day besides The Comedy of Errors, and despite this exception The
Tempest still stands alone since its time-structure is not, as Errors’ is, intended to conform to a
theory of unity or some measure of theatrical decorum.4 The Tempest, having certainly no
theatrical example to pattern itself after, is a much different matter. About four hours are said to
elapse during the play, between I.ii.41, which is “at least two glasses [past the mid season]” and
V.i.4, “on the sixth hour.” Although the acting of the play takes approximately two hours,5 The
Tempest is as close as Shakespeare ever comes to presenting an entire five acts in real time. It is
not, strictly speaking, real time, since we are shown events that must be occurring
simultaneously or that require a small amount of intervening time; nor is it real space, since we
must move, from scene to scene, around various spots on the island. But nonetheless it can be
said (though perhaps surprising at first) that in The Tempest, among the most fantastic of plays in
the canon, Shakespeare requires our suspension of disbelief as little as possible. Spectators might
reasonably be requested to “eke out [the] performance with your mind” when the stage presents a
Harpy (as in III.iii), or to honor Henry V’s chorus and imagine “the vasty fields of France”
confined within the theater. To request these things of an audience is to request suspension of
visual disbelief, which entails the self-conscious production of an illusion, whether undertaken
by the players or by each of the spectators for him- or herself. It is another thing entirely to
4

Moreover, the unity of The Comedy of Errors does not represent a dramatic decision or judgment on
Shakespeare’s part, as the play is an imitation of Plautus and the setting and duration are thus the responsibility of
the earlier playwright. While episodes in Shakespeare’s adaptation are developed in original ways—for example,
Errors does not take place in a single location as the Menaechmi does—the concept of the play is indebted so deeply
to Plautus that its presentation of time (which unlike the setting is “unified”) cannot be stated unequivocally as
Shakespeare’s invention.
5
Corroboration: the BBC’s 1980 video version is 124 minutes long: just over “two hours’ traffic.” Alonso
offers an estimate of “three hours” at V.i.189.
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present spectators with a set of actions within the “two hours’ traffic” of the stage and request an
audience to believe that they have been occurring over two weeks, one month, one year, sixteen
years, or what you will. The Tempest does not require this of us. Though it may be among the
most dreamlike of plays, its sense of time is the most real, and the most immediately sensible to
us as recipients of the text or of the performance. What I mean by this is that the mindset of one
attending a performance of (or otherwise experiencing) the Tempest is that of the present, in
many respects—most importantly as the play interacts with its past and with its future.
The Tempest shares with us, men and women living in time, the remoteness of our past and
the mystery of our future. The outlook on past and future within the play is the same as our own,
at any given moment. We cannot compress the time between events, nor can we relive the past
tangibly, through our senses. For these reasons, The Tempest is uniquely structured to engage
issues of memory, re-narration, and expectations. In a world (our world) where the past is
invisible yet shapes who we are and what we do, memory assumes a position of the utmost
importance. It is the foundation of the play and the interactions within it. The action we witness
(comparable to the tip of the proverbial iceberg) is the product of all the accumulated past action
that has culminated in the present moment, when “project[s] gather to a head.” This
accumulation is true of every moment in any drama, but the difference is that in The Tempest, as
in life, we do not see the deep past (and the causes of later events, which it contains) juxtaposed
with the event of the present. In our natural perception, we do not see Iago’s temptation and its
disastrous effects within the same two hours. Time Personified does not encounter us at a
convenient moment to announce a gap of sixteen years. All things must develop as they will, and
in any two- or four-hour span much will have to be recalled and retold if our actions are to make
any sense. There is no other way than to recall those many causes; there never will be.
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These concerns (or rather, these conditions arising from the structure of the work) are not
unique to Shakespeare or even to drama; they have much in common with classical epic. Of
course, the time-scale of epic is not comparable to the play (that is, in epic’s much vaster scope,
not in its representation), but the preoccupation with memory, recall, re-narration, and the past
causes of present events is characteristic of the genre, and especially of Virgil’s Aeneid. To say
that Virgil’s poem is a nearly constant presence in The Tempest is nothing new. Much has
already been written about the relation of the two works in terms of their dramatic and thematic
elements, their characterization, and episodes similar in each. Geographically, the shipwrecked
Neapolitan characters themselves are aware of the fact that they are retracing Aeneas’ route from
the old site of Dido’s city to Naples, near the site of Aeneas’ first landfall on the Italian peninsula.
Their awareness of the poem surfaces most visibly in II.i but is present throughout the entire play.
Jan Kott writes that both the characters and the playwright know that the poem is a “key” to the
play, a source of light to throw the heart of The Tempest into relief.6
The insistent allusions to “widow Dido” seem to be what Roman Jakobson would call a
“metalingual” sign, supplying the receiver with the code in which a message is to be
encoded. Shakespeare is telling us: “Remember the Aeneid.” (424)

The sign is undeniable. However, Kott and other writers on the comparison focus mostly on plot
points, dialogue, or the similarity of repeated or imitated episodes (such as Ariel’s portrayal of
the Harpy and his speech, patterned on the ominous prophecy of Celaeno in Virgil’s third book).
What I intend to do is focus on another dimension of the relationship: the time-structures of epic
and the play and the consequences for memory, storytelling, and expectation. The fact that the

6

Kott, Jan. “The Aeneid and The Tempest.” Arion 3.4 (1976): 424-51. Kott also reminds us that the route
traveled by Alonso’s party is not exactly the same, as Aeneas landed on Sicily “where rites of purification were
performed” and funeral games held, as told in Book 5. Both journeys, then, while not identical, are interrupted by
island landings. However, as I will address below, the island of The Tempest has much more in common with
Carthage than any other location in the poem.

7
play seems so inspired by Virgil may offer insight into how the play sees the world, how it sees
its own past, and how it shapes—with that vision—its own future.
The Tempest, situated in a “present moment” as explained above, consists of a series of
retellings and a set of expectations. The retellings fill out (and condition) the play’s image of the
past, and the expectations color its image of the future. Neither past nor future is visible; yet the
present action of the play is made up of the tension between these elements.7 This is not to say
that the play is responsible for fulfilling these expectations; rather, fulfilling them is the
characters’ motivation for retelling. The intangible past and the intangible future are woven
exclusively out of spoken words. Between all sorts of characters in the play, across all varieties
of relationships, is this same pattern of memory leading to prediction, or more simply, from
Experience to Expectation. First and foremost is the relationship of Prospero and Miranda, but
Prospero’s other several foils as well as the Neapolitan party all follow these patterns,
characteristic as they are of the “present-time” orientation of the play. Even if the play lacked the
overshadowing presence of Prospero, its structure would nonetheless remain a constant
interwoven series of retellings and expectations. That said, the world at large does not always
align with expectation, nor is the future responsible for doing so. Indeed, The Tempest contains
several sets of conflicting expectations which cannot, by their nature, come to be simultaneously.
But the desire for the future to align with one’s prediction (as conditioned by memory) is what
matters, and is universal. This desire shapes thought, speech, and action. But there are vast
distances between the present and both the past as recalled and the future as envisioned. It is
these gaps that grant the play its resonance with classical epic. The ways in which they are
encountered and bridged shed light on memory and retelling in the play and the poem.
7

“Tension” might not be as suitable a term as ‘interaction’, since, as we shall see, the overriding motivation of
characters is to bring the two elements, memory of origins and expectation of ends, into harmony, or “consonance,”
with each other.
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While describing the decline of “epic forms” in the face of more modern modes of narration,
Walter Benjamin takes the opportunity to write of the characteristics of those forms in his essay
“The Storyteller.” 8 (The following delineation and definitions are a combination of several
strands from this essay and “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”) He
posits two defining features of epic as pertains to its contents: Memory and Distance.
These are not entirely separate concepts. In fact, they might be better classified under the
single heading of Distance and given the distinctions of Distance Temporal and Distance Spatial.
The common denominator is far-ness, in all dimensions and directions. To introduce two more
helpful terms, memory across temporal distance is “remembrance;” memory across spatial
distance is “transmission.”
Memory is described by Benjamin as “the epic faculty par excellence.” Indeed, the memory
is not only an indispensable faculty of the epic poet but an integral part of the poem he sings. The
unique ability of the poet is to call up an ancient account from times long past, days removed
from his own time. It is from this distance that the epic gains “authority,” an interest to (and thus
a measure of power over) its audience. Inside the text, it is also why the most revered of epic
characters are the rememberers: they who must recount their stories of the past, they who must
provide the foregrounding for the events of the poem since we are forbidden from actually
witnessing such things by the epic convention of beginning in medias res. Memory is not just a
means to virtuosity, a method through which to recite voluminous catalogs of warriors or, say,
sea-nymphs; it is a vital and mandatory faculty for a structure in which we do not know how

8

Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. trans. Harry Zohn. ed. Hannah Arendt. New York: Schocken Books, 1962.
The essay’s subtitle is “Some Reflections on the Work of Nikolai Leskov.”
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things began sooner than we know how they are.9 This is the situation of The Tempest, in which
we witness primarily results and reactions, not catalysts, and furthermore, this situation is true of
our own sense of time. It is the result of what Lady Macbeth calls “this ignorant present”—
ignorant, that is, of origins.10 It is a reason why the epic form (or at least the outset of the epic) is
so attractive—because as men and women born into time, unable to empirically witness causes
but to retell and thus become familiar with the present and then forecast results, our perception
approximates that form.
Frank Kermode puts this idea forward, in slightly different terms, in The Sense of an Ending.
His argument is set up as a commentary on apocalyptic fiction and myth, but is nonetheless
applicable here as the limits of perception (and our storytelling tendencies) persist across genres.
In fact, he uses epic terminology; his initial premise is that the natural perspective on life and
time is that of the medias res narrative.
Men, like poets, rush ‘into the middest,’ in medias res, when they are born; they also die in mediis
rebus, and to make sense of their span they need fictive concords with origins and ends, such as
11
give meaning to lives and to poems.

Men and women are born at an essentially arbitrary point in time at which the action on the
world-stage is already underway. Kermode hypothesizes a human desire to make sense of our
lifespan, to cast our time as “significant.” The resulting tendency, he argues, is to frame our
lifetime with reference to a beginning and an end (that is, a beginning before we were born, and
an end at some point in the future, perhaps during one’s lifetime and perhaps not). But even
though both relatable events are outside our empirical perception, Kermode writes that we

9

Of any process longer than instantaneous, the cause lies hidden. Thus the epic preoccupation with causes: the
effect is empirically observable in the present, whereas the cause is not and must be revealed by memory, aided or
unaided by extra-human assistance.
10
Macbeth, I.v.59.
11
Kermode, Frank. The Sense of an Ending: studies in the theory of fiction. London: Oxford University Press,
1967. p.7. Kermode’s phrasing echoes Paradise Lost 9.40-1,“that which justly gives heroic name / To person or to
poem.”
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nonetheless profess to know a great deal about them. If we are to know their nature, the
beginning (essentially a creation story or origin myth) must be remembered or revealed; likewise,
the end must be foretold. He identifies a desire that the end be in “consonance” with the retold or
received beginning and the “middle” which we are presently experiencing. Before “significance”
there must be “a concord of imaginatively recorded past and imaginatively predicted future,
achieved on behalf of us, who remain ‘in the middest.’” Consequently, with the new revelation
of a beginning or end our “middle” must be adapted so as to achieve that desired agreement.12
Ultimately all these literary, historical, or prophetic efforts are intended to impart meaning to a
span of time which without real or imagined “consonance” would seem an arbitrary or
unprivileged vantage point.
Temporal and spatial distance, which separate us from past and future, and necessitate
memory, cannot be fully disentangled. Changes in the physical landscape over time, for instance,
make the setting of an epic physically remote at the same time as they make the tale temporally
remote. The inaccessibility of epic locations (a memorable example being the classical
underworld) provides another sort of distance. All these varieties of “far-ness” are intertwined in
Benjamin’s discussion of what he terms “information” and the “verifiable.” He writes that the
decline in the popularity and relevance of the epic was brought about by an increase in readily
transmissible information—although he clarifies that these shifts did not, could not, happen

12

An example: Miranda, her origin-story revealed, feels she must make up in the present the awareness she
lacked in the past:
Alack, for pity!
I, not remembering how I cried out then,
Will cry it o’er again; it is a hint
That wrings my eyes to’t.
I.ii.133-5
In order to make sense of her present state, she must supply the part of her origin that she cannot recall, and feels she
lacks.
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overnight, and that this particular change occurred with all the speediness of geological time.13
With the advent of printing and of rapid circulation of printed materials, information presented
communities with facts of a situation, and led to our notion of the state of being “informed.” No
longer having to rely on outmoded accounts of truth, or on received versions of events in other
places, narratives from (or purporting to be from) distant places and times lost their appeal.
Information is what is easily verifiable; facts can be proven or disproven. It is the nature of the
epic, however, to resist verification; it concerns the distant past and distant settings, and its truth
cannot be ascertained—or even tested—firsthand.
Benjamin’s point is that it is their very lack of verifiability that granted epics “authority” in
their prime. Narratives that had traveled vast distances of space and time, and survived the
journey, fascinated listeners not only because of their strangeness but because they were in effect
incontrovertible. Who can say he has been to Troy while it stood? In the absence of any
(impossible) contrary evidence, the epic assumed a mysterious, revelatory, and unassailable
position. Yet as Benjamin notes, a shift in attitude over time—and an increase in ease of
transmission—caused verifiability to become the main criterion of authority. Lack of
corroboration became a flaw instead of a proof of mysterious uniqueness. Listeners became more
concerned with their immediate surroundings (the things able to be readily ascertained) and less
with the deeds of a distant time and place. Even if they did not lose “interest” in epic forms,
audiences began to place epic and “information” in separate categories, differentiating spaces
where there had before been no distinction. The survival of a narrative did not vouch for its
accuracy, though listeners forgot that accuracy was never the primary concern of the epic, and
that epic and what Benjamin calls “information” do not serve the same ends. Considering Virgil
in this light is especially valuable, as he positioned himself at the crossroads of oral tradition and
13

Benjamin, 88.
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literature; his mode of transmission is not oral but literary, yet he casts himself as an oral
rememberer—and, more relevant to the purpose of this comparison, the characters within the
poem function in the old epic mode.14
In “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Benjamin writes of the “aura”
of a work of art, its singularity and uniqueness, the quality which is lost when the work is
reproduced mechanically or inorganically. To appropriate this term from him for my own uses, I
identify this “aura” with the sense of authority once accorded to epic forms, and the sense of awe
accorded to the epic as a result of the distance it contains. Spatial distance and temporal distance
combine to create the epic aura, a mysterious yet incontrovertible account of the distant past. Can
such a sense of aura be forward- as well as backward-looking? If we derive expectation of the
future from a retelling of the past, does an account of the distant future (perhaps in a spatially
removed setting as well) possess the same aura as the past-oriented epic? Perhaps not the same
authority, as the future has not yet occurred. But our expectations of the future—often we
compose and tell their stories before they occur—can have just as aweful an effect on our present
as the epic does.
All these elements of time in narrative lead back to the similarity between the play’s structure
and the epic form that both serve to simulate the mindset and experience of the present. Because
of the limits of the present’s perspective as described above, these structures, by their nature,
necessitate oral renarration. Furthermore, these features of the present moment are made concrete
in the form of what I will call “sites of retelling.” The qualities that define the perspective of the
present are represented physically in significant locations in both play and poem. These locations
are where the major acts of renarration take place: in The Tempest, Prospero’s island and

14

On the tendency for literature to cast itself as an imitation, or descendant, of oral tradition, see, for example,
Robert Kellogg, “Oral Literature” in New Literary History 5.1 (1973), 55.
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specifically Prospero’s cell; in the Aeneid, the city of Carthage where Books 2 and 3 are dictated
by Aeneas. What makes these locations “sites of retelling” is not simply the fact that they
provide a setting for the storyteller, but that certain physical properties identify them as
representations of the present moment.
The primary quality of The Tempest’s island is its Distance from all else—with all the
associations of that term as used by Benjamin and outlined above. Spatially, we cannot be
positive of the Island’s exact location but know it is closer to the coast of Africa than Italy
(I.ii.269-70), and that the nearby city of Tunis is “ten leagues beyond man’s life,” (II.i.247) that
is, farther than a life-long voyage. Yet it is far enough from shore to be an intentional site of
banishment (namely Sycorax’s by the Algerians, I.ii.269, in which the Island seems to be a sort
of penal colony) and unknown entirely to the king’s party. Its solitude and isolation in the sea
echoes Virgil’s description of the ocean as Aeneas departs from Carthage, passing the area in
which the island ostensibly rises: maria undique et undique caelum: “water at all points, at all
points the sky.”15 Especially in Antonio’s speech “She that is queen of Tunis” (II.i.246-54), the
difficulty of physically bridging the gap between the outside (European) world and that of Tunis
(and the Island) is put in terms that rule out all contact from the spatially distant. And like
Carthage, it is only found accidentally. None of the island’s inhabitants or visitors intentionally
finds their way there: Sycorax, Ariel and the unborn Caliban by banishment, Prospero and
Miranda by exile, the king’s party by shipwreck. Aware of this, Gonzalo’s references to
Carthage remind us that though the Island is technically along Aeneas’ route to Italy, its situation
in the work, and its temporal situation, is that of Carthage.
The incomplete city of Carthage is a particularly striking representation of the present. By
this I mean that not only is it the first setting in the epic’s in medias res format, it is also packed
15

5.9. Fagles’ translation.
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full of symbols that give it a progressive aspect (in the grammatical sense of the word). It is
unfinished, composed of memory of the past (Tyre, which its settlers have left behind) and plans
for the future, being drawn up as Aeneas arrives—a city literally depicted as “in progress.”
The entire poem begins in Carthage—not just Aeneas’ landing, which does not occur until
1.172, but the very first descriptive content after the proem, from line 12 onward, is of the city:
urbs antiqua fuit (Tyrii tenuere coloni) / Karthago, etc.16 We come to learn that it is built out of
the memory of the past and predicts an expansion into the future, most often signified by the
frequent references to the not-yet-completed walls rising around the city and Dido’s various
other construction projects. Both tangible and intangible futures are expected for Carthage: on a
physical level, the walls and buildings will be completed, the temples fully constructed, the laws
drawn up (1.423-9). On a less physical level, Dido foresees from Carthage in Book 4 the
narrative future of her city and Rome, culminating in the invocation of the “unknown avenger”
(4.625) and the violent history prophesied in her curses.
The walls themselves seem to symbolize most strongly the present moment, which is never
complete, always in progress. They seem to rise almost independently of their builders. Aeneas
exclaims upon seeing them (remembering the promissa Lauini moenia, his own promised Roman
walls): o fortunati quorum iam moenia surgunt! “O happy men, whose walls are rising at this
moment!” The walls are the subject of this action, the process shown occurring before Aeneas’
eyes. They are not “being built” (i.e., aedificantur) but are “rising” themselves, and serve as an

16

Before we even know the identity of this ancient city, we know that it was established by settlers, coloni,
from someplace else. Regardless of the city’s name, we can be sure before we know it that its inhabitants have
undergone a journey to someplace other than where they originated to establish it. Thus the nature of Carthage as
both a backward- and forward-looking city is established before we even know what to call it.
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excellent metaphor for time and the state of Carthage, the city of present time—as opposed to
Rome, the city of the future, and Troy and Tyre, the cities of the past.17
It is in these locations, the Island and Carthage, that the great acts of renarration take place.
They are necessary not only because of the requirements of form but because of the locations’
physical orientation. These are sites that are only reached by chance after the loss of a physical
connection with the past—after the surrender of Claribel, the loss of the king’s ship, or the death
of Anchises. There is an element of chance in the nature of the present; as Kermode writes, the
moment at which our life-story begins is arbitrary—though somewhat more arbitrary, perhaps,
than the outset of a deliberate narrative. It is the strangeness of these unfamiliar places (locos
nouos, 1.306-7) and the separation from the familiar and the tangible that necessitates oral
renarration. For the very same reasons, these locations engender expectation as well, the
counterpart to memory, and as sites of retelling provide the opportunities for both. The physical
circumstances demand it, and the time demands it (“The very minute bids thee ope thine ear”).18
The several forms of distance, as we’ve seen above, are partly what makes oral retelling
necessary in these locations. The epic quality of these retellings derives from this distance, and
the seeming resistance to verification that Benjamin identifies. If Prospero had recounted
Miranda’s origin story to her at any other time than I.ii of The Tempest, there would be no means
by which to ascertain the truth of his account. Miranda cannot recall the events described, and
the few other inhabitants of the island did not witness it. Barring supernatural revelation, the
story is uncorroborated; the other players involved are a long ways from the island in distance
17

Because of the importance of the walls, among the most striking images in Book 4 is that of the construction
coming to a halt once Dido becomes preoccupied with Aeneas (4.86)—that is, once the time for retelling is over,
and focus shifts to the future.
18
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and in travel-time. But in both the play and the Aeneid, these distances are bridged, setting up
what I will call “unexpected encounters” between characters of the present and those who (to
their counterparts) embody the past.19 That is, one character unexpectedly meets another who can
provide the verification otherwise lacking in an epic recounting or remembrance. Upon hearing
of Gonzalo’s kindnesses to her and her father which proved to be the difference between her life
and death, Miranda exclaims “Would I might / But ever see that man!” (I.ii.168-9) Desiring
verification, Miranda is still at that point unaware that she will encounter the man himself.
Meeting such a man verifies her origin-story; and with that story proven true, she must undergo a
subsequent change in herself. I will discuss at length below a powerful unexpected encounter in
Carthage in Aeneid 1: Dido’s encounter with Aeneas as he stands at the temple wall, gazing at
the mural which includes his own image. The epic account of Troy, here in visual form, is
proven to be extraordinarily accurate by the appearance of Aeneas, who seems to step out of the
distances, a living piece of evidence, a story embodied.
These unexpected encounters abound in The Tempest, given the situations of the various
characters, and provide tension between the epic nature of memory and retelling and the
predicaments the players actually find themselves in: to name a few, the encounter of Caliban
with Stephano, who comes down “out of the moon, I assure you;” of Miranda and Ferdinand,
19

While this formulation is my own, it is supported by Roland Greene’s discussion of islands in early modern
imaginations being the primary sites of encounters that are “discontinuous in time” (139) and in which “something
happens, and then it is counted, recounted, interpreted.” He goes on to speak of the island encounter’s “palpable
investment in alterity” and foreignness, which “factitious opposition establishes identity on both sides.” My
definitions, while original, owe something to Greene’s creative—and correct—descriptions. It is worth quoting
another excerpt from “Island Logic:”
Islands make possible the observation of their own constructedness, and the constructedness of
other measures of the world, because they enforce a certain clarity: they have definable borders,
they are conceptually autonomous from the world at large, and they encourage attention to the
conditions of indigineity and importation. (140)
It is the perspective afforded by “conceptual autonomy” that grants Prospero’s island its status as a prime
location for retelling; all is outside and easily divided from the self for observation, while the associations
which implicate the observer in the world at large are discerned as well.
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and (most self-aware of all) of the Neapolitans with the “strange shapes” and “islanders” before
the false feast in III.iii. This final unexpected encounter culminates in Antonio’s remark that
summarizes the phenomenon perfectly:
What does else want credit, come to me
And I’ll be sworn ‘tis true. Travelers ne’er did lie,
Though fools at home condemn ‘em.
III.iii.25-7

The questions of “credit,” “warrant” (III.iii.49), and verification are as immediate to us as
spectators and readers as they are to Alonso, Sebastian, and Antonio. We know no more of the
truth of the mysterious “islanders” and “mountaineers” than they do; we know no more of the
truth of our received notions of the past than Miranda does. And even when we create a
representation of that supposed past, as Dido does in Carthage, its accuracy is unknowable—
until someone steps out of distant space or time to tell us.

Having established the above concepts as background, we can proceed to discuss the play on
these terms. I.ii is the first great scene of memory in the play. The segments of the scene present
issues that remain at the forefront for the rest of the play and can serve as keys to the function of
memory and renarration as it works throughout all subsequent episodes. This marathon scene
presents to us four sequences of remembrance with Prospero as interlocutor in all but one of
them. The first, with Miranda, demonstrates Prospero’s concept of the operation of memory. The
second, with Ariel, demonstrates the potential of retelling as ritual, and the problem of multiple
resulting expectations in conflict. The third, with Caliban, demonstrates the ability of retelling to
solidify hierarchy. The fourth is somewhat different, as Ariel, unseen by Ferdinand, leads him
around the island with a song that, deceptively, “remember[s his] drowned father.” (I.ii.406)
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Miranda rightly takes her place at the center of the play’s presentation of memory. The great
narration that begins I.ii originates in Prospero’s response to her pleas to “allay” the storm. The
storm is not what it seems, he assures her; neither are herself and her father. Surely some
revelation is at hand. In reminding his daughter that she is “ignorant of what [she is]” it becomes
clear that this is nothing new to her. Prospero has thought better, several times, of revealing her
origin-story.
You have oft
Begun to tell me what I am, but stopped
And left me to a bootless inquisition,
Concluding: “Stay. Not yet.”
I.ii.33-6

But the “very minute” requires that Miranda no longer be ignorant. She is after all the
centerpiece of Prospero’s great “project,” which to use familiar terms is his great exercise in
bringing about a future consonance—a new union strong enough to match the dissension of the
past. The desire for this consonance resonates with the Aeneid, where the only compensation
Venus will accept for the exile and tribulations of her descendants is a return to power. The final
complaint in her plea to Jupiter in Book 1 is sic nos in sceptra reponis? “Is this how you restore
my kin to power?”20 Likewise, Gonzalo will proclaim at the end of the drama, “Was Milan thrust
from Milan, that his issue / Should become kings of Naples?” (V.i.205-6). This is the foundation
of Prospero’s project, and the reason why Miranda, though not as ignorant as some have thought
her, must hear his account.
We are not as interested in the contents of Prospero’s story as in the way it works. By this I
mean the way in which he primes Miranda’s memory for his narration, the way he decides to
sound her mind to see how it functions and what it contains or retains, is the most significant

20

Kott notes the similarity in the representation of this scene—a father with power over the weather and his
fearful daughter watching a storm at sea from a someplace above—to the dialogue of Venus and Jupiter quoted here,
Aeneid 1.223-296. See Chapter 3 for a longer discussion on this point.
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element. He begins, instead of speaking himself, by trying to elicit speech from her. Memory in
both epic and drama is a source of speech; that is, in epic, memory produces the materials out of
which his account is formed, or the poem is crafted or reconstructed. It provides as well the
impetus to do so, the desire to memorialize through speech (as opposed to some other way). In
drama the characters’ individual or collective memory produces the speech which informs us of
their past or pasts. And yet although memory is productive of speech in these cases, in The
Tempest it is, to Prospero, conceived of as a primarily visual faculty. This is demonstrated
immediately in this sequence of recollection. His question, which elicits Miranda’s recall of her
“four or five women,” is especially important.
Prospero

Miranda

Canst thou remember
A time before we came unto this cell?
I do not think thou canst, for then thou wast not
Out three years old.
Certainly, sir, I can.

Prospero

By what? By any other house or person?
Of anything the image tell me that
Hath kept with thy remembrance.

Miranda

‘Tis far off,
And rather like a dream than an assurance
That my remembrance warrants. Had I not
Four or five women once that tended me?

Prospero

Thou hadst, and more, Miranda. But how is it
That this lives in thy mind? What seest thou else
In the dark backward and abysm of time?
I.ii.38-50

To determine what Miranda has retained and what she has lost, Prospero asks her to tell images.
When she recalls the image of the women, he asks further: “What seest thou else?” Prospero
recognizes that the material of memory, its most fundamental component, is visual and not
verbal. These remembered “images” can serve to incite retelling, but he realizes that the retelling
is a degree removed from the raw matter of memory itself, and thus must undergo a sort of
translation. As in any translation, especially in one which moves from one medium to another
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(visual to verbal) instead of simply across languages (say, English to Spanish), there will be
certain things which simply cannot be carried across.
Prospero’s request to Miranda consists, then, of three parts: “Of anything the image tell me.”
The past event occurs, then is remembered (or “kept”) as an image, and is finally related as
speech. Not insignificantly, Prospero’s syntax puts the request in this chronological order
(event—image—relation), and “the image” is both central in the line and the subject of the
sentence.
But as for the specific image itself, it cannot be made completely certain that the women
Miranda remembers are in fact the more-than-five maids that once tended her in Milan. Her
confession to Ferdinand that she is “skilless of” the way of the world abroad is especially telling,
with its emphasis on the image—and illusion—that forms the basis of memory. She approaches
Ferdinand in III.i while he is piling up “some thousands of these logs,” the “mean task” that
Prospero has set him to. His recall of the “several women” he has known before prompts this rich
response from Miranda:
I do not know
One of my sex, no woman’s face remember
Save from my glass mine own; nor have I seen
More that I may call men than you, good friend,
And my dear father. How features are abroad
I am skilless of; but, by my modesty,
The jewel in my dower, I would not wish
Any companion in the world but you;
Nor can imagination form a shape
Besides yourself to like of. But I prattle
Something too wildly.
III.i.48-58

Considered side-by-side to her initial exchange with Prospero, the operation of memory here
seems much more dubious. What remains constant in both scenes, however, is the importance of
the image, the knowledge that memory is made of “shapes” and “features” rather than words. Of
course, we are surprised by Miranda’s admission that she does not remember another woman’s
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face, which seems to erase the image of the women she had called to mind in I.ii.21 In any case,
memory and experience are collected through vision, especially vision of other people, and
stored as such; Miranda subscribes to this view even as she forgets what she had recalled earlier.
Yet Miranda indicates that her expected future is in some way constrained by the raw visual
material of her memory. “Nor can imagination form a shape / Besides yourself to like of.”
Recalling Kermode’s conjecture that the predicted future is crafted out of consonances with the
past (or vice versa), Miranda cannot form the shape of a human male face besides Prospero’s and
Ferdinand’s—or rather, the shape that she does form is Ferdinand’s, and in the scarcity of
alternatives, she has no choice but to be attracted to it.
Her admission (and specifically the language she makes it with) at the beginning of the
speech raises the possibility that her recall of the women is on some level a recall of herself. The
“image” of the women that she related to Prospero may indeed be her “glass.” Suddenly, the
word “image” as Prospero used it in I.ii.43 becomes very unstable. As above, he ostensibly refers
to the way in which events are stored in the memory as images. In that case, the “image” is true
memory, photographic at the best of times, and it is the relation, the translation into speech,
which may distort it somewhat. But in Miranda’s speech, “image” takes on shades of meaning
more in line with its original Latinate usage. Imago, imaginis: a dream, shadow, phantom, shade,
an immaterial reflection. Prompted by Prospero to reveal “the image” that has kept with her
remembrance, Miranda prefaces her response, “‘tis...rather like a dream than an assurance”
before relating the memory of the four or five women.
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There are several explanations for the discrepancy: Miranda is not being truthful in order to appear modest
(“prompt me, plain and holy innocence!” 82); her prior recall of the women in I.ii was elicited in some way by her
father’s art; her recall of the women was unstable from the beginning, “rather like a dream, than an assurance,” and
thus not worth mentioning; or, to split hairs, she does not remember the women’s faces.
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The same word for her recalled image might just as well be applied to the faces she sees “in
my glass” (they are both imagines), and perhaps most unsettlingly, the process of shape-forming
she describes at the speech’s end is given the same name of “imagination.” She states, more or
less explicitly, that it is the function of “imagination” to “form a shape” out of the visual material
of memory. It seems much more likely, in this light, that Miranda is being honest with Ferdinand
here and that her image of the women is in fact her own reflection.22
Miranda, as above, is a valuable character for examining the operation of memory—and yet
it is destabilizing when she mixes the vocabulary of memory with the vocabulary of imagination.
Prospero is responsible in some sense for this, asking his daughter “the image tell me” when
what that question means to her is likely very different than what we as spectators take it to mean.
We might interpret: “Tell me the picture, as you have it, of that past event,” whereas Miranda
might hear: “Tell me the picture, as you have assembled it from your observations—mostly of
your own self.”23
22

A couple practical considerations: we can assume that Miranda has been educated in the differences between
women and men, in appearance and anatomically, enough to allow her to distinguish between the images of one and
the other. In I.ii she speaks of her grandmother and clearly knows how the sexes interact, that women give birth to
children while men do not. Additionally, the incident with Caliban (as remembered in I.ii.346-52) may have made
that lesson necessary. At any rate, she knows enough to recognize the similarities between the images of Prospero
and Ferdinand to realize that they are one of a kind, and that any third man (“a shape / Besides yourself to like of”)
will have certain common features with these two previous men.
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It is also significant to note that Miranda’s speech is prompted by Ferdinand’s anatomizing of the “several
women” he has previously “liked” into their constituent features. This sets an example for her to divide up the
“features” she stores in her memory after observation and conceive of the “shape-forming” process of imagination
as she does. The Arden edition cites many precedents for this cataloging of independently remembered features,
among them As You Like It III.ii.145-6 (“Thus Rosalind of many parts / By heavenly synod was devised”); I would
add to this list Olivia’s itemization of her body in Twelfth Night I.v (“I shall give out divers schedules of my
beauty”). This pattern belongs to a conceit common in Renaissance poetry (cf. Sonnet 130).
23
This terminology calls to mind Adam’s explanation to Eve of the difference between Reason and Fancy in
Paradise Lost 5, in which Milton uses these same terms in an analogous way. Shakespeare’s memory is to Milton
Reason as Shakespeare’s “imagination” is to Milton’s Fancy:
Of all external things,
Which the five watchful senses represent,
She [Fancy] forms imaginations, airy shapes,
Which reason joining or disjoining, frames
All what we affirm or what deny, and call
Our knowledge or opinion.
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In Virgil, imago is Aeneas’ word for the shade of Creusa, insubstantial as he tries to embrace
it in his flight from Troy.
ter conatus ibi collo dare bracchia circum;
ter frustra comprensa manus effugit imago.
Three times I tried to throw my arms around [her] neck;
three times the shadow, grasped in vain, fled my hands.
2.792-3

These lines are themselves part of a recollection—Aeneas’ tale to Dido—and thus an “image” of
an image. And just as Miranda suggested about her own “imagination,” these lines are repeated
(or rather reflected) verbatim by the epic’s narrator when Aeneas encounters the shade of
Anchises in the underworld (6.700-1). The words can be repeated exactly as they appear in Book
2—no changing of feminine to masculine is required, since imago is always feminine, whether it
denotes Anchises’ shade or Creusa’s. The most important feature is that an imago is immaterial,
whether it be the shades of the underworld or Miranda’s reflection.
This relation between image, imagination, and memory as expressed by Prospero and
Miranda finds an interesting comparison in Aeneid 1.441-93, the first and perhaps most powerful
of the “unexpected encounters” described above, in which Aeneas comes across the depiction of
the war at Troy painted on the wall of the temple of Juno at Carthage. The hero finds the image
of his memory materialized in an unexpected place. The illustration is so accurate (or rather, so
consonant with his own memory) that he recognizes all of the major players in the scene—
including himself.
What is the depiction of Troy doing of Juno’s temple in Carthage to begin with? The war was,
in a sense, “won” by Juno, though that can hardly be the reason;24 Carthage is impartial in regard

5.103-8
Despite the complete devastation of Troy, she still resents the war’s memory, as in 1.23ff., id metuens
ueterisque memor Saturnia belli / prima quod ad Troiam pro caris gesserat Argis…
24
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to the war; if anything, the Carthaginians’ predicament is similar to that of the Trojan refugees. I
think rather that the fascination the story held for Carthage has to do with the reasons epic is
attractive, the “distance” in Benjamin’s theory of storytelling. (It should be remembered as well
that the scene of the war is hardly laudatory of the Achaians and their allies.) As accounts of the
war made their way out from Troy over its duration, the geographical distance gave the story the
features of epic Benjamin has identified.25
Aeneas, then, to put it in familiar terms, encounters an image (i.e. an imago, a shadow) from
his own memory depicted materially. He feels he must “cry it o’er again” (as Miranda feels at
I.ii.134), since viewing the images serve the same purpose as recalling the images mentally—
perhaps even more intensely, as this reiteration was so unlooked for. It prompts him to exclaim,
“quis iam locus...Achate, / quae regio in terris nostris non plena laboris?” (“What place is there
now, o Achates, what country on earth that is not full of [the story of] our suffering?”) The
significance of this moment becomes clearer when we realize that this is the first real glimpse we
are given (in Aeneas’ eyes) of the hero’s own history. His first speech in the storm hinted at the
prior experience of the war (1.94-101), yet we do not have a definite picture of his past, or of
where exactly he is coming from. Suddenly, coming ashore in a foreign land, he finds his own
prologue depicted by the artists of an alien people. Within the in medias res structure of epic, this
moment is extraordinarily powerful. Even before Aeneas’ own account of the events depicted
(Book 2), we see the hero’s prior experience as it abides (according to Prospero) in his own
memory—as a series of images.
It is indeed a series; he proceeds down the mural, viewing each section episodically. Just as
Miranda does, he recognizes himself among the images of his memory, although of course he
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transmission of a narrative would have served the same effect.
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knows the appearance, the “features” of both men and women, Trojans and Achaians, Amazons
and Ethiopians.
se quoque principibus permixtum adnouit Achiuis
Eoasque acies et nigri Memnonis arma.
He even recognized himself, there in the midst of the Achaian chiefs; he recognized the
hordes of the East, and the arms of black Memnon.
1.488-9

He realizes that he is himself an image in not only his own memory but in what might be called
the “cultural memory” of Carthage itself. Although he has never met a Carthaginian in his life,
his image on the temple is so recognizable to himself and to the rest of the city that Venus must
shroud him in a mist so that “he will be recognized by no one” (1.400, neque cernitur ulli). The
defining feature of Carthage, as noted above, is that it is constantly under construction,
incomplete—yet on these unfinished walls Aeneas encounters the image of his own memory. Of
all the parts of the the unfinished city, the mural seems remarkably complete. The temple it
belongs to is itself in progress (hic templum Iunoni ingens Sidonia Dido / condebat, in the
imperfect tense: “here Dido of Sidon was in the middle of constructing a massive temple to
Juno”), yet the mural is, strangely, finished, rich in detail and uncannily accurate. That this
representation of memory is present in this completed form even in the unfinished city of
Carthage demonstrates not only the city’s nature as a representation of the present but of the
potential self-reflection that Aeneas might, in fact, be seeing instead.

Although Prospero’s theory of the operation of memory as he states it to Miranda (and as
Miranda seemingly absorbs) is visual by nature, the intensely verbal nature of recollection comes
to the fore in Prospero’s other encounters in I.ii. Most importantly he demonstrates the possible
functions of renarration, and its power as a recurring ritual. His account to Miranda is a unique
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event, without precedent in their relationship; it could be specifically called a revelation or
transmission. But Prospero’s subsequent encounters with Ariel and Caliban could in contrast be
called “transactions” of recollection.
Confronted with Ariel’s request that Prospero remember his promise to release him from
Prospero’s service (I.ii.242-50; the terms of the his promise are not completely clear, only that
Prospero pledged to remit “a full year” of Ariel’s servitude) Prospero begins a sequence of
recollection which, he states in frustration, he must periodically repeat to remind Ariel of the
spirit’s past condition—and consequently, his debt to Prospero. Ariel tries to do the same thing
first, however, to recall Prospero’s own promise. The exchange is full of multiple conflicting
expectations, derived from each character’s respective version of the past. It is worth quoting at
length to examine the patterns in their dialogue.
ARIEL

Is there more toil? Since thou dost give me pains
Let me remember thee what thou hast promised,
Which is not yet performed me.

PROSPERO

How now? Moody?
What is’t thou canst demand?

ARIEL

My liberty.

PROSPERO

Before the time be out? No more!

ARIEL

I prithee
Remember I have done thee worthy service,
Told thee no lies, made thee no mistakings, served
Without or grudge or grumblings. Thou didst promise
To bate me a full year.

PROSPERO

Dost thou forget
From what a torment I did free thee?

ARIEL

No.

PROSPERO

Thou dost. . .hast thou forgot
The foul witch Sycorax? . .Hast thou forgot her?

ARIEL

No, sir.

PROSPERO

Thou hast! Where was she born? Speak. Tell me.

ARIEL

Sir, in Argier.

PROSPERO

O, was she so? I must
Once in a month recount what thou hast been
Which thou forget’st. . .Is not this true?
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ARIEL

Ay, sir.
I.ii.242-68

Prospero’s questions are certainly not meant to elicit “imagination,” as with Miranda. This is an
interrogation, but one with a set of expected answers. The dialogue is almost didactic, a ritual
enacted at predictable times in which the questions and answers are never in doubt. Prospero
must have Ariel speak the responses in his own voice, and even as he responds correctly is still
subject to Prospero’s sarcasm: “O, was she so?” In its formulaic nature the dialogue could even
be said to be similar to liturgy or catechism, learned by rote and solidifying roles. It is a wellknown script they both adhere to—and furthermore, the adherence to it presupposes, and
confirms, the power dynamic between master and servant.
Notice that Ariel’s key word in the exchange is “remember,” while Prospero’s is “forgot.”
Perceiving his role as the arbiter of memory, the holder of the books, and the recounter of history
to Miranda, Prospero chastises Ariel for his inadequate memory, while Ariel, recalling promises
made, is all prediction and expectation. It becomes clear how much Prospero takes the offensive
when Ariel attempts to cast himself in Prospero’s role as the keeper of memory. Ariel’s
remembrance of the virtues of his service, and of the words of Prospero’s promise, is countered
by his master’s even more distant remembrance, of Ariel’s torment by Sycorax, which he goes
on to recount at length even though he did not witness it firsthand—essentially appropriating
Ariel’s memory for his own uses.
Lina Perkins Wilder also notices the difference in the “mnemonic methods” Prospero uses
in dialogue with Miranda, Ariel, and Caliban. To Wilder, however, most instances of originstories, whether Miranda’s or Ariel’s, have models in the anatomical language of birth. Wilder
identifies the “dark backward and abysm” of Prospero’s conception of time as mirroring “a birth
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canal,” and that Prospero’s questions to her suggest she is “searching for her own birth.”26 The
fear of Sycorax that Prospero seeks to re-instill in Ariel derives, for Wilder, from the witch’s
“sexual aberrance,” and the “gaping” of the cloven pine suggests to her another birth sequence.
Finally, with Caliban she writes that Prospero’s control is actually physical and not symbolically
physical (the torments Caliban is subjected to involve real pain). All this said, I agree in the
latent imagery of birth-origins, but do not agree with Wilder that the imagery of memory owes so
heavily to human anatomy—unless, as demonstrated above, the empirical observation of
“features,” which Miranda is deprived of, can be included under this category.
But anatomically (in a different sort of way), the terminology of the senses is of the utmost
importance in the processes of renarration, namely the sense of hearing. We have seen that in
Prospero’s view, a retelling consists of three parts: the experience, the preserved image, and the
translation into speech. For the receiver of the story, the experience is entirely aural. Any image
that might be called to mind as a result of hearing the retelling is never verifiably accurate.
Especially when the retelling does not just remind or reinforce, as Prospero’s recurring sessions
with Ariel and Caliban do, the sense of hearing takes on an imposing role. Nowhere in the play is
this better demonstrated than in Ariel’s speech as the Harpy in III.iii (“You are three men of sin”),
the central scene of the play and not coincidentally the single episode most literally adapted from
Virgil. Considering the details of this scene, specifically the physical effects of speech on its
hearers, gives us a perspective on one of the most important potencies of Prospero’s art of
memory.
To begin with the speech’s aftermath, consider Alonso’s stunned response to Ariel’s speech
and sudden disappearance, spoken as he stands in a “strange stare.”
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O it is monstrous, monstrous!
Methought the billows spoke and told me of it,
The winds did sing it to me, and the thunder,
That deep and dreadful organ-pipe, pronounced
The name of Prosper. It did bass my trespass.
III.iii.95-9

This is one of the most vivid sensory descriptions in the play, and this short scene is packed with
sensual information (appropriate to an episode in which the travelers are confronted with
previously unexperienced sights, sounds, and smells). But all other faculties seem to melt away
and give place to the single unrelenting force of hearing. Ariel states that his Harpy form is
intangible and impervious to swords, and that the Neapolitans’ physical power to lift their
swords has disappeared. This deadening of motion seems to be characteristic of Prospero’s
powers; the same effect appears at I.ii.467 when Ferdinand is “charmed from moving.” But this
particular capability is of great significance. The loss of other sensory power or motion
necessitates that the victim be still, and hear. The Neapolitans are subject to the same transfixing
in V.i when they are “spell-stopped,” enforced to listen to Prospero’s great reckoning. Even the
sight of the Harpy does not register in Alonso’s memory; only the sound of Ariel’s doom-laden
voice, it seems, has permeated nature to deliver only the words (or more exactly, the word: “the
name of Prosper”) and nothing else.
In contrast to the unexpected encounters that lend credence to accounts of the past elsewhere
(Prospero as he will encounter the king in his ducal robes, the revelation of Ferdinand, Miranda’s
meeting Gonzalo), Ariel presents no evidence of his account. His only medium is the words
themselves. The image of the “trespass” still exists, but only in the memory of Alonso and
Antonio. This is all because Ariel is not speaking from his own recollection, but from
Prospero’s—just as in I.ii, Prospero recounted Ariel’s memory of Sycorax for him. Ariel is
explicitly presenting a “performance,” and Prospero makes it clear that Ariel is speaking only
from his script. He praises the spirit for his strict adherence to it (“Of my instruction hast thou
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nothing bated / In what thou hadst to say,” 85-6). To bring this into line with Prospero’s
conception of memory, Ariel’s purpose is to supply the final, verbal, component to the image
that the “men of sin” already possess. When the contents of their memory, however latent or
suppressed, are linked with Ariel’s announcement, the entire world appears to have heard and
understood. Gonzalo identifies the guilty memory as a “poison given to work a great time after,”
but such a poison has no effect until the retelling of it is complete; that is, until it is given verbal
form.
The Harpies in both the play and the Aeneid are entirely impervious to wounds from human
weapons. They cannot be warded off or defended against, and those to whom they appear must
endure the message they have to deliver.
The elements
Of whom your swords are tempered may as well
Wound the loud winds or with bemocked-at stabs
Kill the still-closing waters, as diminish
One dowl that’s in my plume. My fellow ministers
Are like invulnerable.
III.iii.61-6
sed neque uim plumis ullam nec uulnera tergo
accipiunt.
(But their feathers are not subject to physical force, nor their backs to wounds.)
3.241-2

In the Harpies’ immunity from material weapons, I read them as signifying the terrifying potency
of oral delivery. “But remember, / For that’s my business to you,” Ariel announces at the heart of
his speech. It is not his intention to harm the travelers with physical violence (only by hunger,
through causing the feast to vanish) but to force them to listen. The charm of heaviness on their
swords, recalling the spell on Ferdinand in I.ii, is the hallmark of Prospero’s art, the “spellstopping” that all the Neapolitans experience at some point in the play. Wilder and Tribble define
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this spell as the primary capability of Prospero’s magic.27 But the corollary to this observation
must be that it relates directly to his mastery of retelling and recollection. Those who are spellstopped are rendered passive and cannot choose but hear what is being told them. Wilder tries to
cast this as an example of his “colonial” uses of memory, his efforts to dominantly direct
recollection instead of solicit it from and independent subject, as the dialogues with Ariel and
Caliban in I.ii provide evidence for. Yet the uses of this power, not always so overpowering or
dominating, rather reflect most of all the great power inherent in oral renarration that is so central
to the play in both content and structure.
The power we’ve seen to be inherent in speech and all the varieties of orality and storytelling
we’ve encountered are crucial to Prospero’s art and the role he performs in the play. His
relationships with Miranda, Ariel, and Caliban are constructed out of the fundamental elements
of language—and not simply because what we have of them are pieces of dramatic speech. His
relationships are built on the teaching and repetition of words, and out of words, broader
narratives and larger narrative exchanges. For this reason, the following chapter will take a
somewhat different approach and focus on the specific situations—and paradoxes—of both
Miranda’s and Caliban’s education by Prospero. The education he gives them both in language
(and which they later exchange with each other) allows them to participate in the exchange of
narratives out of which the play is crafted, in the process of concealment and revelation so
prevalent in the last plays, and in the exercise of recall and expectation characteristic of the
Island, the ultimate site of retelling.

27

This is true, if we only count those elements of his art that we witness on stage and not through his own
report, i.e., the capabilities listed in V.i.33-50, “Ye elves of hills.”
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Chapter 2
“You taught me language”

“I have done nothing but in care of thee,” Prospero calmly declares at the outset of I.ii, to
allay Miranda’s fears over the storm which, he assures her, was only perilous to her perception,
not in fact.1 This is Prospero’s second full line of verse in the play, and the first which contains a
single thought coextensive with the line. Experiencing it performed we may not notice its
extreme significance, nor apply it, as Prospero himself instructs us to, as a standard by which to
measure all his subsequent (and reported prior) action in the play. What does this care consist of,
in relation to our question of memory and retelling? There is only one scene in the play that
features Prospero and Miranda alone together—the fundamental and programmatic I.ii, centered
on Prospero’s narrative of Miranda’s origin story. Because, owing to this perspective, the
clearest insight we have of Prospero’s care is in the narration of his great narrative, the nature of
his care seems to be more linguistic, verbal. All he has done is in the service, ultimately, of the
narrative he chooses to reveal to her—and through that, for her.
That even the titular tempest is placed, by Prospero himself, under the category of his “care”
for Miranda underscores the significance of the central act of retelling in I.ii, to which this
opening exchange is (at first glance) a short preface. What Prospero calls his “care” is
demonstrated most clearly in the exchange. The fact that he refers to it as such reminds us that
his raising of Miranda is, as much as that which he refers to in the Epilogue, a “project” of his.
1

He makes sure she knows her senses are sound; they have not misled her. Rather the truth of the ship’s fate
(that it is completely unharmed) lies beyond what she may perceive.
[There is] not so much perdition as an hair
Betid to any creature in the vessel
Which thou heard’st cry, which thou saw’st sink.
I.ii.30-32 (Italics mine.)
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The revelation to Miranda of her past, and the information he grants her in the course of the
scene, is honest but not entirely forthcoming; it is one of many steps—probably the most
important, and perhaps the last—in her upbringing, centered upon the retelling of words,
narratives, and ultimately causes from father to daughter. The “care” he mentions is, at its most
essential, the ongoing transaction between the two of them, not just of words but about words, a
constant re-narration which, as Prospero implies in a single line, contains not just the crisis of the
tempest, but the sum of his actions, and all of The Tempest itself.
In raising Miranda, Prospero serves several different functions: guardian, teacher, ally,
adversary. None of these are unusual or surprising, but what they respectively entail becomes
more interesting under the unique circumstances of their exile. In the absence of any other
human contact, Miranda must learn all she knows from Prospero’s lessons, or from unexpected
crises (such as Caliban’s attempted rape) which elude Prospero’s close watch over her education.
The role he seems to identify the most with himself is that of teacher. “The last of our seasorrow,” the end of the great tale in I.ii, is the following:
Here in this island we arrived, and here
Have I thy schoolmaster made thee more profit
Than other princes can, that have more time
For vainer hours and tutors not so careful.
I.ii.172-5

The key word “care,” charged from the first by Prospero’s statement of dedication, reappears
here at the conclusion of the story, emphasizing (though in a negative construction) the role
Prospero most sees himself playing.2 The part he plays in her care is, primarily, that of
schoolmaster and tutor.3 He decides what she must know, and how she comes to know it.

2

In a certain way the use of the negative (“tutors not so careful”) emphasizes the word further, allowing it to be
placed emphatically at the end of the line, and of the speech as a whole. The Norton’s gloss on “careful” as “caring”
certainly conveys the point but pushes to the side the complementary sense of “care” as a Latin derivative of cura: a
troubling concern due to a personal responsibility. Prospero’s burden of raising Miranda in the way he chooses to

34
This instruction, we come to learn in the scene, takes the form of a repeating question-andanswer ritual between the two of them. Miranda, who if anything is not dedicated to “closeness”
for the “bettering of [her] mind” (I.ii.90) is not one to learn from the “secret studies” that
consumed her father’s attention as duke. In other words, the secret—and most importantly,
silent—mode of book-reading and learning through print is explicitly Prospero’s domain—or at
least, that of Duke Prospero, never of his daughter. Miranda’s mode is the oral and aural, the
listening and responding that make up her recurring didactic exchanges with her father.
Of course, as many commentators have noticed, we never see Prospero’s books or witness
him reading them. They are kept, we learn, so deep within the cell that when Prospero is “hard at
study” (III.i.20) he can be counted on to be completely absent for “these two hours” out of the
play’s six. As will be demonstrated below, although Prospero is the nexus at the center of the
world of speech in the play, he to some extent represents the world of print. But the
overwhelming importance (not quite power) of speech in the play ensure his shift from that
former function to his climactic statement, “I’ll drown my book.”
If indeed we are to determine the nature of Miranda’s education and the extent to which it
prepares her to receive the epic revelation of her past in I.ii, we might consider at this point the
question of her literacy. Oral retelling is the epic mode, yet the hidden books lurk in the play’s
background—and in Miranda’s awareness. Interestingly, the play offers no definite information
on Miranda’s literacy. Perhaps Prospero has learned from his exclusive obsession with the
written word, which demands “closeness,” secrecy, and most of all silence, that his daughter

can certainly be called one. Thus the final word of the speech conveys both his duty owing to love as well as the
“vexation,” as he will call it at IV.i.158, of such service.
3

“Tutor” in turn has the Latinate meaning of “protector.”
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must be—if she is to complete his project—turned outward, and ready to speak and receive
speech. Prospero describes his own engrossment in the word:
I, thus neglecting worldly ends, all dedicated
To closeness and the bettering of my mind
With that which but by being so retired
O’er-priced all popular rate, in my false brother
Awaked an evil nature.
I.ii.89-93

His closeness becomes the active agent of his demise. This does not argue for or against his
support of Miranda’s literacy; but her education, if anything, constitutes an opening, a greater
apprehension, in contrast to Prospero’s experience and symbolized most clearly by her
emergence from the space “within” in the play’s final scene. This increased awareness is both
practical (a revelation of the number and diversity of human forms) and, more importantly for
the question at hand, temporal (a coming to be familiar with her own past, “what I am”). But
even taking all this into account, there are no references to her having been taught to read, and
her instruction of Caliban (“I taught thee each day / Some thing or other”) is a course in spoken
language, learned not from writing but from speaking and repeating lessons. She is never shown
reading in the play, nor mentions having read anything. She only refers to the action, “study,” as
the reason for her father’s periodic absence, deep and distracted.
But her literacy may bear a broader definition. Miranda reads, if not texts, symbols. She
knows the game of chess, if not exactly what its pieces stand for (V.i.174-8); that is, being raised
in her circumstances, she may not understand, for example, the distinctions between the pieces
on the board, but realizes that nevertheless there is a hierarchy among them as well as a set of
rules (line 174) which can, but should not be, transgressed—the same attitude she took with the
prescriptive grammar she had once attempted to teach Caliban. And even though Caliban, though
certainly illiterate (“a sot, as I am,” without the written word), cannot use the contents of
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Prospero’s books, he nevertheless exhorts Stephano to seize them, using their power in a
negative capacity even while unable to make positive use of them himself. Indeed, the possession
of the books seems to become a metonym for proficiency in language—and the control of
narrative accounts that comes along with it, which Prospero attempts so fervently to achieve and
maintain.
Remember
First to possess his books, for without them
He’s but a sot as I am, nor hath not
One spirit to command—they all do hate him
As rootedly as I. Burn but his books.
III.ii.86-90

This power is acquired by Prospero through the use of the books, but it is transmitted—spoken—
to Miranda and in turn to Caliban (though each subsequent recipient receives progressively less
and less of the original wealth of wisdom they contain). Radiating out from the mysterious books
are the oral modes which become so crucial in learning to speak and then putting that speech to
use on the island, where oral retelling is the only medium for history, the only outlet for memory.
In contrast to the way language is controlled and disseminated by Prospero, the Neapolitans
are certainly literate. Of course, taking the setting into account, no other character besides
Prospero is actually in possession of books because of the condition of their arrival on the island.
Yet besides the simple (but extraneous) social reason that the nobles would have to be bookreaders, the king’s party shows their literacy through their allusive language. In II.i.75-81
Antonio, Sebastian, and Gonzalo show their familiarity with Virgil, until 82 in which Gonzalo
corrects Adrian with an equally informed example from historical geography (“This Tunis, sir,
was Carthage”). But entrance into the world of the island, which as argued in Chapter 1 is
defined by its Distances, necessitates a shift to oral modes of communication because of the very
nature of those Distances. The king’s party even receives, aurally, the prophecy of their doom
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with all its spell-stopping force, even if they cannot quite understand what it was they heard—as
in Alonso’s dazed “Methought the billows spoke and told me of it,” (III.iii.96ff.)
We return to our previous question. Even if Miranda’s literacy remains a question, the effect
of that ambiguity is itself instructive and should be paid more attention that the question itself.
Prospero’s intentions, his uses of language, and Miranda’s own expanding self-awareness
interact around it. Miranda’s greater awareness of her past (not necessarily her memory of it)
illuminates the space held before by Prospero’s retelling, and the expansion of her perspective,
certainly including the revelation of human forms, may help to revise her earlier confusion about
whether (as discussed in Chapter 1) the women she recalls from her childhood, the only image
salvaged from the “dark backward and abysm” were distinct forms or reflections of her own
image. Perhaps in this widening of perspective she is intended to achieve what Prospero could
not by his former “close” dependence on the written word.
The name she gives to her ongoing didactic exchange with her father is “inquisition,” or a
rigorous inquiry. While such a description places great importance on her curiosity, at the same
time it reinforces Prospero’s position as the island’s regulator of memory—or at least his attempt
to be so. When granting Miranda knowledge of things from elsewhere than on the island, the
scope and depth of such revelations is entirely under his control. He is in command, both in the
basic language he teaches to his daughter (there are no other ‘linguistic’ influences on the island)
and in the narratives he tells her. But all these things are invisible and intangible, or at least not
observable on the island, and her education takes the form mostly of learning that which cannot
be gained through empirical observation on the island itself.
In the very first exchange of I.ii, Prospero’s art supersedes even Miranda’s own senses; that
is, the information she seems to gather herself, her unaided perception, is disproved by Prospero.
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The pattern that becomes apparent is that real knowledge is of that which cannot be seen—due
its Distance as described above, or because its usage has been appropriated by one more
powerful. In fewer words, Prospero controls (by disproving) even what Miranda sees and hears,
all as a component of her “care,” her education. However much this is motivated by love, his
language is still—always—imperative, giving commands for control, gentle as they may seem:
Be collected.
No more amazement. Tell your piteous heart
There’s no harm done. . .
Wipe thou thine eyes, have comfort…
…Sit down,
For thou must now know further.
I.ii.13-33

There is no denying what she has heard and seen; as perceptions they are true, but as truths they
are false. The position of importance given in the play to transmission across Distances seems
here, at the very beginning, to supersede even the information one has at hand. Likewise, even
Prospero’s knowledge that the ship is safe, the “provision in [his] art,” is communicated to him
indirectly through Ariel’s report. Messages are constantly concealed, transplanted, carried from
far off. This only intensifies the concluding face-to-face encounter of all the players, when, with
Prospero’s rough magic abjured, the men (and woman) can at last trust to the “sensible and true
avouch” of their own eyes.

Miranda’s “inquisition,” in context, raises questions not only about how she comes to know
what she knows of the past, but also about what constitutes that knowledge. The most interesting
aspect of Miranda's education is her knowledge that what she knows is incomplete, and this
demands a question—which we will pose precisely later—of what may be called positive and
negative knowledge. Active memory and recall, with which we have mainly been concerned,
demand an object—yet what is the effect on the student, the novice (as Miranda might be said to
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be) when a blank becomes part of an account of the past? What if this gap conceals the most
fundamental part of the story? The complications are many, especially since in Miranda’s case
the negative space is learned and maintained in the same way as the positive.
As we have seen, Miranda's education seems to have taken the form of a repeated questionand answer (as repeated in the education of Caliban).4 But Prospero, we know, has concealed
answers from his daughter, constructing gaps in the most fundamental regions of her memory;
and yet the concealment of an answer is almost an answer in itself. Here is Miranda's reminder
before the narration begins:
You have often
Begun to tell me what I am, but stopped
And left me to a bootless inquisition,
Concluding, “Stay: not yet.”

She is as aware of the lacuna in her memory as of any other piece of information that Prospero
has seen fit to transfer to her in his role as “schoolmaster” and keeper of books. Moreover, she
knows that what he has kept from her ears is the answer to the fundamental question “What am
I?” She is unaware (or at least relatively unaware) of the temporal and spatial distance that make
the responsibility for answering lie solely on Prospero, yet her uncertainty as to what she is—
while she goes on being whatever she is—testifies to the epic situation of the play and Miranda's
role as its epic center.5 As one would expect, the unanswered question becomes the most
intriguing.6 Miranda can hardly be blamed for seeking it out, if Prospero's epithet for her is more
than coined on the spot: “thee, my daughter, who / Art ignorant of what thou art.”

4

Repeated, that is, by Prospero or Miranda. The speech prefix at I.ii.354 has been the center of debate as the
Folio assigns it to Miranda but as in Greenblatt’s note to the line, many editors “believe it to be out of character” for
her. Whether Prospero endows Caliban’s purposes “with words that made them known,” or whether Miranda does
so as his surrogate, is not really within the scope of this question (nor is Miranda’s “character,” whatever it may be).
5
Her being herself does not require her knowledge—but her satisfaction, her sense of authenticity or fulfillment
in being that self does, by standards not universal.
6

This situation may be reflected in the Folio reading of line 35:
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Because she is so aware that her knowledge is incomplete, she is also aware that her
education, Prospero's “care” of her, has a specific duration—that at some point it will be
completed, similarly to his other “projects.” She senses—and he confirms—that this “doom and
date”7 is bound up with the revelation of this story, the answer to the question “What am I?”
Consider Prospero's reported deferral of the answer: "Stay: not yet." They both wait for a time
when “the very minute bids thee ope thine ear,” though Miranda's ears are open already,
specifically for this answer. Prospero, however, knows the exact nature of this crisis and
culmination, and why it necessitates his narration. Miranda, constantly delayed by the concise
but impossibly dense reply of “Stay: not yet” knows both that she lacks knowledge and that her
process of revelation is bound up with time.
Miranda’s statement on her bootless inquisition is, like so much of the opening of this scene,
compact and worthy of the closest readings. But we cannot quite get a sense, from her words, of
how she came to know what she does not know. As she puts it, Prospero himself took the
initiative (“You have oft begun...”); it seems that his careful construction of narratives, and
Miranda’s origin-story among them, is so involuted that to tell of one cause leads to another, all
the while realizing that his great project requires restraint and control. This interweaving is
present in the narratives he rehearses with both Ariel and Caliban as well—stories bleed into
parallel stories, and the nature of his relationship with one depends on the relationship with the
other. Ariel’s responses in I.ii, seemingly from rote, cover Caliban’s origin as well, as their two

and left me to the bootelesse Inquisition.
In every modern edition, ‘the’ is the undeserving victim of emendation to ‘a.’ But the sudden precision and
detail of “the bootelesse Inquisition” shows the central space this mysterious question holds in Miranda's awareness.
Didactic exchanges have occurred between father and daughter on several topics, but inquiry into this one, the
greatest question of all (“How did I come to be?” “How did I come to be here?”) is given a definite, and entirely
accurate, name.
7

Sonnet XIV.14.
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situations are inextricably linked by the figure of Sycorax, whose presence looms over the play’s
past (and the memory of it) like a shadow.
Returning to the original question, I propose that the distinction between Miranda’s “positive”
knowledge and “negative” knowledge is not as clear as it seems.8 Miranda’s education has been
in everything but what she herself is, and this (lack of) knowledge informs her character as much
as anything positive that she has learned. Her situation is unique in that she is, to herself, a
“blank” (to use Viola’s phrase connoting both an emptiness as well as a vacuum attracting
whatever presents itself to its pull), while at the same time she is completely unique to herself. “I
do not know / One of my sex,” she confides to Ferdinand in her crucial speech on memory and
imagination, and yet she does not know what that identity signifies in relation to the world at
large.
What Miranda rehearses with Prospero, then, is the fact that she does not know who she is—
and this becomes as much a fixture of her identity as the rehearsal of Ariel’s story becomes to the
spirit, or as the repetition of Caliban’s history becomes to him. As referenced above (in Chapter
1), Prospero’s memory sessions with Ariel and Caliban are periodic events; they recur with
predictable regularity, and through their repetition the participants learn the proceedings by rote.
Long after the practical purpose of remembering has been achieved and maintained (however
much Prospero believes his foils need “reminding”), the interactions take on the feeling of ritual.
“I must / Once in a month recount what thou hast been / Which thou forget’st,” says Prospero to
Ariel, notifying us of the period; Prospero and Miranda’s visits to Caliban are regular, for he,
habitually, never yields kind answer. Having previously discussed the ritual, almost liturgical,
nature of the proceedings between Prospero and Ariel, I would like to extend the focus to

8

Just to be clear: “positive” meaning actual recall or teaching, “negative” meaning awareness of a gap in
knowledge, as in “You have oft / Begun to tell me what I am, but stopped...”
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Caliban, specifically as his “education” (or domestication) by Prospero contrasts with that of
Miranda.
Called forth by Prospero in I.ii, Caliban assumes while still offstage that physical labor is the
purpose of his summons. But Prospero has other plans, as he speaks one of the play’s most subtle
lines:

PROSPERO

What ho, slave! Caliban!
Thou earth, thou, speak!

CALIBAN

There’s wood enough within.

PROSPERO

Come forth, I say! There’s other business for thee.
I.ii.316-8

This “other business” is the ritualized exchange of narratives, which the two presumably engage
in at every meeting, just as Caliban curses at every mention of Prospero’s name, even when
speaking to himself (as in II.ii, “All the infections”), with as formulaic a regularity as that of the
Homeric epithet.
Prospero’s command, his first imperative to Caliban, is not “Fetch us in fuel” (line 369) but
“Speak!” Read in this light, several of Prospero’s remarks about what exactly Caliban does take
on a new significance. After his role of log-bearer (which will be assumed by Ferdinand),
Prospero tells us only that “he...serves in offices / That profit us” before his command to speak.
The narrative exchange, as one of the many “offices” Caliban performs, profits Prospero in
solidifying the dynamic of power between the two, regardless of the historicity, or accuracy, of
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the events described. Caliban himself admits that the truth of their contending accounts is largely
irrelevant— “I must obey: his art is of such power,” he concedes.9
In fact, it is not as fitting as it seems to call this episode an exchange (an event in which two
distinct things are offered between parties and the outcome may be uncertain when the exchange
begins). The outcome is not in doubt, nor does the accuracy of the retelling matter: due to the
force of Prospero’s art, the official “recorded” history will be what he says it will be; but as we
have seen, this authority derives from threats of violence rather than from the superiority of
Prospero’s account.10 The same distance that makes retelling necessary also makes differences of
opinion difficult or impossible to resolve—impossible, that is, in the absence of objects enduring
from the past (generally speaking, artifacts, such as the “stuffs and necessaries” Prospero
received from Gonzalo) or entities bridging that distance (those involved in the unexpected
encounters described above). Thus the power to retell and the dynamic of who is speaking and
9

The rest of this line may be useful to consider: “—his art is of such power / It would control my dam's god,
Setebos, / And make a vassal of him.” The power within Prospero's speech, given a life of its own in Caliban's
phrasing, is strong enough to dominate Setebos who, we can perhaps infer from Caliban at II.ii.133, was introduced
to Caliban in a similarly “distant” act of retelling and conflated with the man in the moon. His conception of the god
is vindicated when he perceives Stephano to be Setebos (“the man i'th' moon”), come down to the earth to verify the
story in an unexpected encounter. Ironically, the man in the moon is also invoked by Antonio to illustrate the
difficulty of transmission across spatial distance between Tunis and Naples:
[Claribel] from Naples
Can have no note, unless the sun were post—
The man i’th’moon's too slow— till newborn chins
Be rough and razorable. . .
II.i.243-6
The pair of sun and moon also figure into Caliban's idea of speech as they are the first (or an example of the
first) things that Prospero taught him how to refer to by name (I.ii.337-9 and above). It was either Sycorax or
Miranda who taught Caliban about the man in the moon. (The answer depends on whom Caliban means by “my
mistress” at II.ii.133.)
9

Sycorax herself is excised from memory as mediated by Prospero since, in his words, her deeds are “terrible /
To enter human hearing” (I.ii.266-7), thus shut out of the oral/aural exchange. Even if they could be tolerated by
human hearing, only Ariel, as Sycorax’s former servant, could give an account from memory; not just a witness,
Ariel’s “affections,” as he states pensively at V.i.19, are not human, and he is certainly not bound by limitations on
“human hearing.” But he never speaks a word about what provoked Sycorax’s banishment from Argier.
10

Certainly no authority derives from the “majority rule” argument that Prospero and Miranda vs. Caliban is
two-on-one.

44
who is commanding speech lie above the real or imagined accuracy of the speaker’s recollection.
In a way, that dynamic (with its attendant consequences) is already decided beforehand, as the
very terms on which the interaction takes place is Prospero's territory.
I have discussed above Prospero's scheme of recollection, how he understands our process of
retelling from memory; he shares it with us when he says to Miranda
Of anything the image tell me that
Hath kept with thy remembrance,

making the process clear both in sense and in syntax (as discussed in Chapter 1). These are three
consecutive translations; and I have already noted that in any translation from one medium to
another, something will be lost or, at the very least, imperfectly altered. Yet up to this point I
have gone without mentioning the obvious truth that the final step of Prospero's process, the
translation from image to speech, must take place in language—and thus on terms not entirely
belonging to the speaker. Prospero did not himself create the English that he speaks in and that
he teaches Caliban, yet the terms on which his dialogues with Caliban occur are his own, given
by him even if no longer controlled by him. Caliban famously insists that his own will has
trumped the intended effect of his education in language:
You taught me language, and my profit on't
Is: I know how to curse. The red plague rid you
For learning me your language!
I.ii.366-8

yet he does not realize that his cursing only furthers the exchange of narratives, which was never
on his own terms. Moreover, his education in language has been—similarly to Miranda's—
rooted in causes, in aetiology, in learning how things came to be. Language is given through
teaching causes, and becomes the medium for retelling them, a system congruent on its several
levels and on both large and small scales.
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In her chapter on The Tempest in Shakespeare’s Memory Theater, Lina Perkins Wilder
approaches Caliban and Ariel as subjects of what she terms Prospero’s “mnemonic colonization,”
bringing postcolonial readings into contact with the present question of the power of retelling
and Wilder’s own project of exploring Renaissance memory arts in the late plays. Her reading
casts Prospero’s representative interaction with Caliban in I.ii not as an exchange but as an
aggressive act on Prospero’s part of clearing Caliban’s memory and refocusing it to suit his ends.
The end he aims at is what she calls a “fantasy of executive control,” Prospero’s self-casting as
the ultimate arbiter of memory in the play. (We shall return to his attempts to play this role
below.) Arguing that all of the late plays form around a conflict between this fantasy and
“divergent or dissonant voices,” her analysis of Caliban rightly acknowledges that even though
the medium of language in which Caliban gives voice to his curses is not his own, he holds the
power to turn it, reflexively, inward upon itself. His is a dissonant ‘voice’ in multiple senses—
both the perspective belonging to him as well as his literal voice, the words to which he gives
breath.
Yet what she casts as a refocusing or erasing of Caliban’s memory she also calls, more
rightly, a “conflict of rememberers.” Though we have seen that verbal and physical power may
nullify the superiority of one account over another on grounds of its ‘accuracy,’ the encounter is
nonetheless a conflict as both opposing recollections do indeed exist. The difference is not
necessarily in facts but in what I will call “past expectations” or “extrapolations.” Neither
Prospero nor Caliban deny that the latter predates Prospero on the island, yet whether that makes
him “king on’t” or subject to Prospero’s ‘colonizing’ power is the real dispute. More clearly,
none denies the fact of Caliban’s intention in the incident with Miranda. Although intentions are
not so easily proved as physical facts, neither denies that Caliban aimed at rape. The conflict,
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then, is between expectations held at the time of the event recalled. For Prospero it would have
been a violation of “the honor of [his] child;” for Caliban:
Would’t had been done!
Thou didst prevent me; I had peopled else
This isle with Calibans.
I.ii.352-4

The narrative encounter is not an erasing or, as Wilder might have us believe, an indoctrination
with a colonial agenda. Caliban’s “office” as a rememberer is one that profits Prospero, but both
narratives are recalled and brought to light; the dominating power does not silence Caliban, but
only makes him surrender (only temporarily, only until the next encounter) after both accounts
are drawn out and spoken, and the dynamic between the two is renewed in the synthesis of
narratives.11
If this seems like splitting hairs, it is important to realize that Prospero’s “pedagogy” has
allowed Caliban to rehearse a narrative that Prospero has not taught him, even as the medium of
that narrative derives from Prospero himself. He is granted—even exhorted to use—his freedom
to speak. The encounter between the two takes place on Prospero’s terms, in the English blank
verse which he speaks, yet Caliban’s recollection and his conflicting “past expectations” are his
own—not introduced by Prospero, as Caliban’s holding them are not profitable to his master.
Only once both accounts are laid out in the “conflict of rememberers” does Prospero’s verbal art
assert its power. Nor could this relationship be maintained if Caliban actually did internalize and
accept what Prospero casts as historical fact. What he does internalize (and become just as much
a master of) is the scene that they rehearse over and over, a number of repetitions beyond
count—not the truth of one or the other, but the conflict between them. Miranda says as much
when she recalls that she taught Caliban to speak not so that he might repeat Prospero’s precepts
11

It is also worth noting that, so far as we can tell, Prospero never makes good on his threats of violence. (The
closest we come are the “inward pinches” which Sebastian and Antonio suffer while immobilized onstage in V.i.)
The threats to Caliban are, within the parameters of the play, another part of the verbal routine they rehearse.
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as dogma, but that he might make his own “purposes” intelligible to them. It is hard to overstate
the importance of this distinction. In this way, Wilder’s theory of Prospero’s “mnemonic
colonization” must be revised to consider that the conflict of the two is the steady state towards
which the process tends—not an ongoing battle in which the dominating magus will eventually
triumph. It is not Prospero’s prescribed accounts of the past but the conflict itself which becomes
liturgy.
Jonathan Baldo interprets the dynamic of memory between Prospero and Caliban as
sometimes mirroring and sometimes opposing known colonial practices.12 Baldo writes that
colonial powers, functioning under the assumption of native peoples as “of weak remembrance,”
attempted, through the erasure of the memory of the colonized population, to “export oblivion”
to the colonies and supplant local memory with authoritative history, often in the form of
writing—which was seen to symbolize the indelible, incontrovertible account of the colonizing
culture. His argument is compelling as he suggests that Prospero is in effect “going native” (123)
in his insistence on the importance and primacy of oral narration over the written texts that he
owns (namely, his books). Prospero simply acts as circumstances demand and as the Island
necessitates. Whether this constitutes a choice on his part is debatable, but it is insightful of
Baldo to notice that Prospero’s adoption of oral—native—modes does not elevate or claim to
legitimize his accounts over those of Caliban on grounds of accuracy. Caliban is subdued
through the verbal power of Prospero’s art, but his voice (though “dissonant and divergent,” in
Wilder’s terms) is hardly silenced. The dynamic is a sort of static conflict, not an overbearing
domination on either part.
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Once we realize this, we can acknowledge that the interaction between the two is never onesided, overpowering though Prospero may be and given whatever qualitative differences may
exist between what each of them offers the other. Consider Caliban’s speech “This island’s mine,”
in which he describes the initial exchange between them, and their mutual instruction of each
other.
When thou camest first,
Thou stroked’st me and mad’st much of me, wouldst give me
Water with berries in't, and teach me how
To name the bigger light, and how the less,
That burn by day and night: and then I loved thee
And showed thee all the qualities o’th’ isle,
The fresh springs, brine-pits, barren place and fertile:
Cursed be I that did so!
I.ii.335-42

Here an opposition is set up between what Prospero teaches and what Caliban teaches. Prospero
teaches language—namely, how to name—and Caliban teaches experiential knowledge, things
known by intuition or observation in a way that language is not. One teaches names, the other
“qualities.” Names are completely bound by speech, while knowledge of qualities does not
require it. It can be complemented by language, but is not dependent on it, as Caliban makes
clear in his promises to provide services to Stephano similar to those he once did to Prospero:
“Let me bring thee where...”, “I will dig thee...”, “[I will] instruct thee how to snare...” When
Miranda maintains that she “endowed [Caliban’s] purposes / With words that made them known,”
she means that she gave him the ability to complement these demonstrative actions and intuition
with the ability to describe them. We must disagree with her, however, when she prefaces that
line by telling Caliban that “thou didst not, savage / Know thine own meaning.” He knows his
meaning, but the separation between meaning and expression was alien to Caliban and was only
realized when he was introduced to Prospero’s language. The introduction of such a rift is
necessary for the “conflict of rememberers” to take place, since the rememberers must be able to
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understand each other. A “side effect” of Caliban’s new power of speech is his usage of it to
describe his former way of life as a forager—the very service for which Prospero loved Caliban
and took him in. In a passage second in its music only to “Be not afeard: the isle is full of noises,”
Caliban offers his services to Stephano:
I pray thee, let me bring thee where crabs grow
And I with my long nails will dig thee pig-nuts,
Show thee a jay’s nest, and instruct thee how
To snare the nimble marmoset. I’ll bring thee
To clust’ring filberts, and sometimes I’ll get thee
Young scamels from the rock. Wilt thou go with me?
II.ii.159-164

In the passage, the beauty and euphony of the language he has learned shines through, rare for
Caliban in that the sound of what he says, the exact thing that Prospero and Miranda have tried to
reform in him, takes precedence. The sound of his “gabbling” was what marked him in the
newcomers’ eyes as a thing most brutish, yet here sound dominates meaning—to the point that
(for example) “scamels” is a hapax legomenon: it is not used anywhere else in English, nor is a
definition attested anywhere.13 He has at once both achieved and defied what Prospero has taught
him to be: he speaks their language—and well—but to such an extent that the exact meaning is
lost. Even if the sense is not lost, it becomes somewhat irrelevant; and Caliban reverts to his
former state of showing, not telling, all the qualities o’th’ isle. Stephano ensures as much in his
reply to Caliban’s euphony: “I prithee now, lead the way without any more talking.”

By acting both as a speech instructor as well as the holder of the mysterious books, Prospero
casts himself as the regulator of speech in the play’s world, a role which seems to make sense
when we witness his ability to “spell-stop” and his dialogues with Miranda, Ariel, and Caliban.
Yet his desire to be so also seems at times as much of a “fantasy” as Wilder makes it out to be.
13

Greenblatt et al. emend F’s reading of Scamels to “seamews,” and then gloss the word as “seagulls.” This is
unnecessary, disrupts the music of the line, and very much defeats the purpose of the passage.
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Indeed, as his project gathers to a head and the play nears its conclusion, he feels his power over
memory—if not over speech—weakening, leaving him primed for a new round of realizations
and a different sort of awareness.
While indulging, somewhat unlike himself, in a “vanity of mine art” to present the pageant of
Ceres and Juno to Miranda and Ferdinand, Prospero breaks off the masque with a striking
realization that something, despite all his attempts at control, has slipped his mind.
I had forgot that foul conspiracy
Of the beast Caliban and his confederates
Against my life. The minute of their plot
Is almost come.
IV.i.139-41

This situation seems to be strangely inverse to the great retelling in I.ii in that remembrance in
both is crucial to explain and avoid crisis—the present moment is of the utmost importance. As
Prospero tells Miranda, “the time’s now come. The very minute bids thee ope thine ear.” This
failure of memory is deeply unsettling, even disturbing, for Prospero, perhaps compounded with
regret over using his art in pursuit of “vanity” and nearly suffering for it. Caliban’s foul
conspiracy has only been percolating for no more than two hours, and thus Prospero’s failure to
remember might seem of a different sort than the long-term recall of I.ii. Yet given the periodic
nature of his encounters with “the beast,” his lapse in memory is lapse in the process they have
maintained since Caliban was enslaved.
But we cannot ignore the fact—especially not when considering this moment—that
Prospero’s mastery of memory, or his attempt to master the memory of the environment in which
he operates, is made possible because he does not act alone. With Ariel attending on him, he can
retain and perform more than any man could do on his own. This is a primary reason why the
decision to release Ariel at the play’s conclusion is as momentous an occasion as drowning the
books or breaking the staff. By using Ariel as a sort of external memory (at least partially),
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Prospero also opens the door for Ariel himself to formulate his own desires, his own expectations
out of that memory. Even while aiding Prospero in his great project, Ariel remembers his
promise of freedom; that which enables Prospero also gives rise to the desire to be freed from
that role. I consider this aspect of Ariel’s service to Prospero a more fitting application of
Wilder’s idea of “divergent and dissonant voices” among Prospero’s subjects, in that Ariel
comes to be at cross-purposes with himself.
Furthermore, it is at this moment of forgetting in IV.i that Prospero’s dependence on Ariel,
even over-dependence, becomes clear.
PROSPERO

Spirit,
We must prepare to meet with Caliban.

ARIEL

Ay, my commander. When I presented Ceres
I thought to have told thee of it, but I feared
Lest I might anger thee.
IV.i.165-9.

Ariel has placed his role within the “vanity” of his master’s art above his role as memory agent,
and has actively withheld something which Prospero has forgot. Ariel’s admission is fascinating
in that Ariel omits information from Prospero in much the same way as Prospero had earlier
withheld the secret of “what I am” from Miranda. The magus has assumed that this authority, the
position of deciding what information must be brought forth and recalled and what must lie
hidden, is his alone. But due to whatever factor it may be, he no longer holds the monopoly over
memory he professed to hold. The realization of his own dependence is startling and disturbing
to him, especially because it comes on so suddenly and the consequences (should he have
forgotten entirely) would have been so dire.14

14

That is, if we really believe that the conspirators pose a threat to Prospero’s life. They would definitely not
have found in sleeping in the afternoon, as Caliban had proposed as the ideal time to murder him.
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Perhaps it is Ariel’s impending freedom that makes him aware of his weakening grasp over
his memory and others’; his loss of control, Miranda tells us, is unprecedented—
Never till this day
Saw I him touched with anger so distempered
IV.i.144-5

—and it provokes from Prospero himself an honest admission of his condition:
Sir, I am vexed.
Bear with my weakness. My old brain is troubled.
Be not disturbed with my infirmity...
...A turn or two I’ll walk
To still my beating mind.
IV.i.158-63

When Miranda realizes and acknowledges the gaps in her own memory and recollection, it
serves as an instigation to inquire more, to learn more. Prospero, much older, sees it as a
reflection of his own “infirmity.”
Caliban declares that without his books (that is, without aids to memory), Prospero is “a sot,
as I am.” We need not go so far as to agree with him, but it is clear that Prospero’s casting of
himself as the arbiter (judging what is appropriate to be known and recounted and when) and
controller of memory is based on factors not innate to himself—his books, the service provided
to him by Ariel, even Sycorax and Caliban who gave him mastery of the island and the island’s
history. He makes sure to qualify the elves of hills and brooks of his great speech in V.i (“by
whose aid, weak masters though ye be...”) as both feeble and as assisting him in physical tasks
rather than memorial, but his dominance is based on external factors to which he gives the
general name of “charms” (Epilogue.1). When these are overthrown—by none other than
himself—the importance of memory and oral retelling reasserts itself, both in Prospero
newfound realization of the difficulty of the task, and in the knowledge that the burden of it will
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now be placed on the younger generation, for which he has prepared Miranda the whole time,
and for whom his entire project was designed long before the tempest began.
Having examined the role of education, language, and speech as they relate to oral
retelling—having considered our questions on a small scale—we can proceed to expand the
discussion to a greater scope. The following chapter will first take a step back from the text of
the plays to discuss early modern conceptions of the passage of time; secondly, it will consider
alternatives to human memory in the last plays, specifically the presence of oracular figures;
lastly, it will apply these terms to our discussion of The Tempest, most importantly the “head”
towards which Prospero’s project gathers: the climactic scene V.i.
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Chapter 3
“The voice o’ th’ oracle”

Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore
So do our minutes hasten to their end,
Each changing place with that which goes before:
In sequent toil all forwards do contend.
Nativity, once in the main of light,
Crawls to maturity, wherewith being crowned
Crooked eclipses ‘gainst his glory fight,
And time that gave doth now his gift confound.
Time doth transfix the flourish set on youth
And delves the parallels in beauty's brow,
Feeds on the rarities of nature's truth,
And nothing stands but for his scythe to mow.
And yet to times in hope my verse shall stand,
Praising thy worth despite his cruel hand.
Sonnet LX

The speaker of Sonnet LX gives voice to what Ricardo Quinones identifies, in his opening
chapter of The Renaissance Discovery of Time, as a pervasive metaphor for the newly redefined
experience of time by individuals in the early modern period. Quinones catalogs several
medieval conceptions of time that would become outmoded by the Renaissance and play a large
role in defining the nature of the era and the sentiments of its individuals.42 In Quinones’ account,
Time to the medieval mind was not a personal possession in the modern sense, not a commodity
in short supply capable of being hoarded or squandered like currency or put to effective or
ineffective use. Largely because they were dominated (or at least governed) by the organizing
and regulating power of the Church, communities operated in a frame of “communal time,”
attending to the lifespan of the group rather than those of its individual members.
Magnificent and costly building projects could extend over several lifetimes before the effort
was completed because time, while easily exhaustible by single men, was not seen as such;
rather, it was conceived as being almost infinitely abundant on the grand scale of the world. Even
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the newly-invented mechanical clock was slow to supersede the old devotional methods of
telling time, which cast the day and its hours as a cycle of recurring but ultimately static periods.
Bells would ring out time-divisions during the day, the same for all alike in the community. Such
a regular cycle had repeated itself innumerable times before any given man's birth, and would do
so long after his death.
Mutability was not regarded in this outlook as the principal attendant on Time. If there was
any goal, any teleological end towards which time and its use tended, that goal was an endpoint
of the grand line of world history, an eschatological theory of end times and final judgment. The
individual end of each man was subordinated to this larger design. This doctrine, when received
from authorities in the community, leads by an alternate road to the tendency which Kermode
writes of: the sense that true significance lies not in the frame of one man's life but in a broader
span of history, and man's subsequent desire for consonance in his actions with an invisible past
and future—actions which include, most notably, the making and valuing of narratives and
fictions.43
But to arrive at that desire by the constrictions of a society or the precepts of dogma is an
alternate road to the one Kermode describes. As he writes of it, that desire (and the impulse
towards storytelling) is innate, intuited by every man or woman. To clarify, I would add to his
argument one condition: that the men and women who feel the storyteller's desire do not live in
total isolation. The sense of a large-scale design among events on a vaster scale than one's own
life is only felt when one comes into contact with others: other people, other forms, other objects
elsewhere along the trajectory from origin to decay (or the eternal, off that trajectory altogether).
In the absence of these encounters, which to some degree are always comparisons, there would
be none of Kermode's sense that one's birth or death is temporally arbitrary (an entrance or exit
43
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in medias res); that is to say, purely hypothetically, that in total isolation, both social and sensory,
one would have no reason to believe that his birth was not the origin of the world (or of
everything perceptible) and that his exit from that world (if conceivable) would likewise be its
end. This imaginary situation, of course, does not take into account the possibility of revelation
from outside or from above. To use terms familiar from the preceding sections of this discussion,
if we cannot perceive otherness or distance we will lack the desire for storytelling, let alone retelling or aetiology. Likewise, if we cannot understand our limitations—and believe that all
things are observable to us—there will be no desire to narrate, to transmit.
Quinones pauses in his account of shifting early-modern attitudes to draw our attention to the
metaphor of the process of time as the movement of waves. He locates it first in Ovid’s
Metamorphoses 15 and in Golding’s corresponding translation, and traces its development
through Dante and Shakespeare, including (though he does not cite it explicitly) Sonnet 60. The
innovation of the wave-metaphor, to Quinones, lies in the distinction it draws between
individual-time and world-time (or the eternal: the time of divinity). Every minute of human life
is both pursuer and pursued, occupying the same physical space (the body of the man or woman,
and their physical environment) but replacing the previous minute and to be replaced in turn. The
process is completely natural and requires no effort on anyone’s part, yet at the same time is
described as “sequent toil,” aggressively harming the body with such actions as “transfixing,”
“delving,” “feeding.” The waves are transient, rising and falling in the same motion, like a breath,
and at the same time permanently damaging in the harm they inflict upon youth, beauty, and “the
rarities of nature’s truth.” As Quinones writes, “this essentially natural process...is also one of
exclusion and thrusting out.”44
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The metaphor, especially as it works in this Sonnet, is much more than a pretense for the
speaker to set up an opponent for his “eternizing conceit” in the final couplet. The waves-as-time
are not established from the outset of the poem as the enemy of record and memory, as they are
(for example) in another prime example of the conceit, Spenser’s Amoretti 75 (“One day I wrote
her name upon the strand”), in which the waves-as-time figure is intertwined with the timeversus-memory theme. The eroding, destructive power of the waves themselves is not even a
subject treated in Shakespeare’s poem. The sea does not threaten to efface the memory of the
poet’s beloved, but the sequent toil of the waves, self-destructive, will confound them all
amongst themselves.45
Yet the desire given voice by the eternizing conceit is not only for the preservation of the
beloved’s virtues, to forestall the “lines” in the addressee’s aging face with the “lines” of the
speaker’s poetry, to make memory as permanent as Spenser imagined it might be. It is also a
desire for a certain type of perspective, something to be wished not for the beloved and his or her
memory but for the speaker himself. This perspective is not eternal life but what we might call a
constant present, informed by everything we have considered thus far about the nature of the
present, and its relation to past and future. Just as in the “sites of retelling” detailed in Chapter 1
above (and including both Prospero’s island and Dido’s Carthage), a defining trait of the present
is its dependence on relation and retelling across distance in both time and space. The poet
desires to exist in that moment, regardless of (and often, resigned to) the fate of the beloved. In
the “age to come,” which the poet will not see but wishes to see, his words (in his place) will
45
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recount memory of the past: unverifiable, not subject to the criteria of what the present calls, in
Benjamin’s terms, “information.”46 The eternizing conceit, then, gives voice to the poet’s desire
to become the epic speaker, the storyteller who continues to sing “when all the breathers of this
world are dead,”47 a Nestor, or an Odysseus, a sole survivor.48
Each minute “changing place with that which goes before” is a constant exchange of
perspective for perspective, each one distinguished from its followers by the relation of the
viewer to the circumstances around him. We have seen this to be true in the requirement that
distance and otherness be perceived in order for storytelling to take place. The sequent toil of
minute after minute wears down words, accounts, narratives. The desire to be above that toil, or
to create a “livelong monument” immune to that toil, is thus at the same time a desire to be
removed from the significance of circumstances. The peculiarities of each moment, for lack of a
better term, are the mutable elements upon which time exerts its eroding force. The story that
survives is retold in a locus nouus, a strange new setting where its power is assured by the
distance and dissimilarity between the event recounted and the site of the recounting.
The search for this type of perspective is a dream of immunity from time and its changes
both for the speaker and his words. However much this is a goal to be strived for, it is of course
unattainable (for mortal storytellers). We might call it the ultimate epic perspective, an endpoint
to be sought and never crossed—but the desire for which animates narration and renarration.
46
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Quinones suggests that “in his attempts to manage time, Renaissance man strives to achieve by
means of process what eternity possesses in stasis;” the storyteller, achieving what eternity
possesses, is both present and distant from both his subject and his audience.49 In speaking
generally about the tendencies of Renaissance writers to deal with time, he goes on to describe
this dream of a constant present, not one of many waves but above the system altogether and
lacking the dependence on circumstances:
[M]an's greater desire is to savor the present wholeness and being that he has always conceived to
be the properties of divinity. Of course, as long as man is involved in time this is impossible.
Yet...two ways emerge by which man's experience can break through the condition of change and
simulate the qualities of being. A sense of presentness and a sense of contraction are recurring
means by which [Renaissance writers] attest to their experience of wholeness... Even Montaigne,
on a decidedly less lofty plane, will sense the lines of his own life coming together in the fullness
of the present moment, where past and future are annihilated. 50

This is both entirely in line with epic and contrary to it. As attaining that “fullness of the present
moment” is an approachable but unreachable ideal, what it implies is not actually the situation of
the storytellers who strive for it. Quinones’ supposed “annihilation” of past and future does away
with the need for memory, as from such a perspective there are no causes, only correspondences;
there are consonances between events, but no sequences in which, as Virgil reminds his readers,
the effect is visible but the origin is not,51 no situation in which the roots of the tree are hidden
while what grows out of them is plainly apparent. The survival of the poet (and his words) in the
function of a messenger to “the age to come” is consistent with what we’ve found about epic
speakers, and yet the desire to be outside of time, even to master time, eliminates the elements
that defines such speakers.
It is striking, as Jan Kott observes, that the great scene of retelling in I.ii of The Tempest is (if
not modeled on) an echo of an exchange similar in all but that the participants are themselves
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divine. Noting that the father-daughter pair would likely be observing the first scene’s tempest
from above the stage in the gallery, Kott writes that comparisons to the dialogue of Jupiter and
Venus in Aeneid 1 would have been clear, if not inescapable.52 Venus in Aeneid 1 is, of course,
not ignorant like Miranda of who is aboard the ship she sees wrecked. In fact, the dialogue is an
exchange of conflicting expectations which brings together aspects of both Miranda’s and Ariel’s
initial scenes with Prospero. The daughter questions the father’s motive for raising the storm, yet
the basis of her complaint is that he has turned aside from what he had promised.53
Casting Jupiter as an epic storyteller (and Venus as his audience) highlights the problems we
have just encountered with Quinones’ theory that storytellers strive towards the divine. He is at
once distant from the action he relates in that the action does not require his agency to come into
being; fata (literally, what he has spoken) drives the tale he tells and, as he tells Venus, it
“remains unshaken (manent immota tuorum / fata).” Yet, aware of all that has happened and all
that will be, his narration at once sets up expectation and fulfills it. Despite the objection that
there can be no “temporal distance” aspect of epic in regard to a character to whom time is a
non-factor, Jupiter’s speech is always both recall and prediction. In more general terms, divine
storytelling (removed from the particulars of time and circumstance) is always a retelling, for
what it relates has either already occurred is bound to occur with such certainty that it is in a
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Venus’s questions quae te, genitor, sententia vertit? (237) and quem das finem, rex magne, laborum? (241)
are like Ariel’s:
Is there more toil? Since thou dost give me pains
Let me remember thee what thou hast promised
Which is not yet performed me.
I.ii.243-5
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sense already done. We might take this one step further: the act of divine narration itself, as
much as anything else, causes what it retells.54
Our previous problem cannot (and does not need to be) resolved, because Quinones’ ideal of
the narrator assuming the traits of divinity is never really attained on a human level. But to
attempt some sort of compromise, it seems that there are two time-scales involved in the
character of the mortal epic narrator: that of the story and that of the telling of the story. Both
must be distinct from each other, but not any more, necessarily, than the two physical settings
and the spatial distance between the two. This is crucial for the possibility of the “unexpected
encounter,” the metalepsis, between the worlds of the narrator and the narrated. Such encounters
make epic narration possible, and also give a sense of the disparate scales and distances of the
past being brought together towards the “promised end.” In fact, what is most surprising is when
the two disparate regions appear to be operating on the same time-scale.
Kermode refers to his own notion of the sense of “fullness,” of coming-together, as “crisis.”
What Quinones supposes about Renaissance longing to be in control of time, Kermode suggests
about human storytelling tendencies in general. Kermode’s hypothesis, as we’ve seen in Chapter
54

Another example from Virgil will help to illustrate the qualities of divine storytellers. Later in Book 1, Venus
appears to Aeneas in the disguise of a virgo Tyria, a Tyrian maiden among the emigrants of Carthage, and narrates
to him an account of Dido’s flight from Pygmalion out of Sidon (in which she supposedly was involved). In order to
play the part of a human more convincingly, she prefaces her story by emphasizing the difficulty of the task and the
labor involved in holding all the details in memory:
longa est iniuria, longae
ambages; sed summa sequar fastigia rerum.
1.341-2
She cannot hold all the intricacies of the tale in mind accurately, and will have to follow only the most significant
and memorable portions along the path, as the figurative ambages suggests. If one possesses divine memory it
should follow that there are no fastigia, that is, that no one event is more memorable than any other since all are
equally preserved and able to be recalled. The metaphor of a mnemonic point of reference as a fastigium (a high
point or summit) is a characteristically human figure of speech, the same (though inverted) as that of the most
momentous events leaving the deepest imprints in the memory. It is like one looking back and discerning only the
highest points of a landscape—though we know from the earlier dialogue of Venus and Jupiter that to immortals
there is no real retrospection and time presents itself, to Jupiter at least, as a more or less flat plain, or a scroll
unrolled.
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1, is based on the sense that all men are born and die in medias res, that one lifespan is not
inherently more privileged in its place on the time-scale than any other. Though the resulting
urge is to frame one’s life in consonance with a retold origin and a foretold end, there is
nonetheless a desire to see one’s lifetime as (if not more privileged) more advanced in history,
more “late,” closer to the point at which all disparate threads will gather together to bring on the
eschatological event. His universalizing tone notwithstanding, this is what Kermode gets at when
he writes of both narratives and worldviews that “we think in terms of crisis rather than temporal
ends” (Kermode 30). 55
The crisis, then, is always imminent to the storyteller, and, as a moment of great unity
between past and present, necessitates the retelling and in doing so grants the audience a sense of
“the future in the instant.”56 To the ideal storyteller, the present is, in Quinones’ words, “not
merely the moment at hand; it is summary and all-embracing, compressing in the depth of its
vision a completed and rounded-out picture.”57 Prospero, nearing the end of the narration to
Miranda, makes clear that there is no motivation for his storytelling without some apparent telos,
that to recall the past is useless unless it is bound up immediately into “the present business /
Which now’s upon’s, without the which this story / Were most impertinent” (I.ii.136-8). It is in
his linking of “the present business” to the end of his tale that he gives voice to the immediacy of
the crisis and the convolution of the past and expected futures in the present moment:
Know thus far forth:
By accident most strange, bountiful Fortune,
Now my dear lady, hath mine enemies
Brought to this shore; and by my prescience
I find my zenith doth depend upon
A most auspicious star, whose influence
55

Or perhaps in other words: our nearness to, or distance from, the “end” is more certain or sensible, innately,
than time measured in other units or in recurring cycles (minutes, days, years).
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If now I court not, but omit, my fortunes
Will ever after droop. Here cease more questions.
I.ii.178-85

Baldo notices Prospero’s turn, after the great narration is complete, to a nearly absolute fixation
on the present, so intense that it is to blame for the crucial memory lapse in IV.i. The passages in
which the attractive force of the culminating present is expressed by Prospero are noted, justly,
by Baldo as “the moment’s finest moments in the play.”58 Yet at what seems to be the moment of
greatest expectation, Prospero decides to conceal something from Miranda, as he has done
innumerable times before. As the professed arbiter of memory and “inquisition,” it is in his
power as well to state in the imperative, “Here cease more questions,” and in saying so become
once more the concealer of truth.

Characters in the last plays have a certain awareness of the presence of concealed truth, and
are told of it—or tell it themselves—in ways aligned with epic. Even if the source of this new
knowledge is not divine or is only perceived to be, characters receiving stories seem to assume
the presence of a larger memory, almost a world-memory, which unlike that of individuals is
limitless and can choose to reveal or conceal what it holds. The truth of these accounts, just like
the truth of the tellers’ divinity, is uncertain and sometimes known to the audience to be false
altogether—as in Ariel’s speech as the Harpy in which he not only gives misinformation (“thee
of thy son, Alonso, [the powers] have bereft”) but appears in a false costume, professing to be a
“minister of Fate.” Indeed, Prospero plays upon the Neapolitans’ newfound belief that such
oracles and prophecies might exist.
But these revelations must be distant. To the Neapolitans, they are unique to the island, many
“leagues beyond man’s life,” sure to be as unbelievable and wonderful at home as all the other
58
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travelers’ tales Gonzalo has heard. In The Winter’s Tale the oracle at Delphi, and the message
received from Apollo, is a twenty-three day’s journey from Leontes’ court, which the king
himself remarks is “good speed.” The messages themselves, as well, are as distant to the sense as
they are in space, though characters may try to interpret them. Ariel’s speech seems to Alonso to
be the rumble of thunder pronouncing Prospero’s name. And we, as spectators, are still removed;
we do not hear what Alonso hears, and we do not hear the voice of the oracle.
All these intimations of supernatural truth point to an end, a crisis at which the uncertainty
will be resolved, what Dion, Leontes’ messenger, calls “th’event o’th’journey.” That does not
mean the end is providential or beneficial to those involved. Alonso’s shipwreck seems suddenly,
with his new revelation and remembrance of Prospero, to be the work of fate hurrying him
towards his own death in retribution. Ferdinand’s apparent death completes the illusion. The
terrible remembrance of the past points towards what appears, to him, to be the imminent crisis.
The thunder,
That deep and dreadful organ-pipe, pronounced
The name of Prosper. It did bass my trespass.
Therefore my son i’ th’ ooze is bedded, and
I’ll seek him deeper than ever plummet sounded,
And with him there lie mudded.

In fact, the only element of his revelation that is true is that which he has held within his own
memory since the beginning—the fact of the usurpation—although even that memory is flawed,
thinking as he does that Prospero and Miranda are, undoubtedly, long dead.59 It is difficult to tell
whether Ariel exploits the credulous nature of the Neapolitans by casting himself and his fellow
59

Real solid proof for this only comes later in his question to Prospero in V.1: “How should Prospero / Be
living and be here?” The harpy does not indict the three men of sin as murderers, only as those who “exposed unto
the sea (which hath requit it) / Him and his innocent child.”
On another note, the memory of the usurpation itself seems to be buried deep for the Neapolitans; none of them,
perhaps simply out of reverence for the royalty, notice the parallels between their situation of misadventure by sea
with that of Prospero. It is only when Sebastian and Antonio are plotting alone that the memory of it resurfaces, as
Sebastian searches for—and Antonio freely offers—a “precedent” by which to justify and pattern his actions. Later,
the parallel is drawn explicitly by the harpy: the king’s shipwreck is the “requital” of Prospero’s “exposure unto the
sea.” The underlying notion is that the sea can destroy in two ways—by taking its victims in or by casting victims
out—and that each action is exactly the equivalent of the other, so as to be a balanced, eye-for-an-eye exchange.
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spirits as a ministers of fate, or whether they are left completely without a point of reference after
their encounters with the strange denizens of the island and are bewildered into believing. The
most terrifying thing, however, about the annunciation of the Harpy is that the king and his party
are suddenly confronted with (what appears to be) a memory that does not forget, an intelligence
to which all men and events are accountable, not subject to “man’s infirmities” or the selective
recall they all practice (see note 14 above). Even if this too is only an effect of the illusion which
Ariel presents, it works as it does because it forces the Neapolitans to acknowledge the
weaknesses in their memories, whether inadvertent (simple forgetting) or willed (intentional
repression)—if such distinctions can even be drawn.
Adding to this terrible aspect of the harpy figure is its insistence that, as regards this
concealed and unfading truth, time is not a factor. In the notion of time that the harpy intimates
as belonging to the mysterious “powers,” the past, present, and future crisis are all inevitably
linked, and as far as the powers are concerned, simultaneous.
But remember,
For that’s my business to you, that you three
From Milan did supplant good Prospero;
Exposed unto the sea, which hath requit it,
Him and his innocent child, for which foul deed,
The powers, delaying not forgetting, have
Incensed the seas and shores, yea, all the creatures,
Against your peace.
III.iii.69-74

We know from lines 85-6 that Ariel is speaking from Prospero’s script. If these are indeed the
magus’s actual words, his crafting of them is masterly. “Delaying, not forgetting:” the speech
Prospero has given Ariel hints at a memory which is as solid and infallible as that of objects and
physical traces—only more aweful and threatening because it is immune to deterioration over
time unlike physical objects and, more terribly, it has both agency and will.
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The physical remains of the past may be lasting: Prospero’s books and robes are proof of
Gonzalo’s aid; Antonio’s ducal robes testify to the fact of the usurpation. But these artifacts, as
we could call them, do not proclaim their own interpretation; they are susceptible to being
construed (or misconstrued) according to individual memories, as the distance in time between
the rememberer and the deed in question makes verification impossible. But the terror of the
harpy’s supposed curse is that the mysterious “powers” retain knowledge of both fact and
intention. Antonio shows off his robes to Sebastian (II.i.268-9, “look how well my garments sit
upon me: / Much feater than before”) which bear no indication in themselves of the deed done to
obtain them.
Thus physical traces are susceptible to being construed in various and perhaps contradictory
ways dependent on individual memories; how much more the memories themselves! Yet
ironically, the harpy’s speech as composed by Prospero raises the possibility of a higher,
unforgetting memory. At the false feast, the effect is achieved because Ariel assumes what he
knows his mortal audience will perceive as the “properties of divinity:” knowledge of facts60 as
well as intentions, agency, and indifference to time. The fact that this possibility is suggested
(essentially, pretended) by means of artifice is only secondary to the demonstrated power that it
holds over its audience.
The fascination of the harpy and its prophecy, although both its “figure” and its words are
feigned, is part of a larger fascination in this play and The Winter’s Tale with the oracular, in
truth concealed and revealed. This is no surprise given what we’ve already examined about the
time-scale of The Tempest, in which the reception of all information about the past is in some
way a revelation—though its truth may be in doubt. The characters’ search for ‘historical’
accuracy and the divergent opinions about that history testify to the uncertainty of authority,
60
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while Prospero’s narration above all testifies to his assumed role as both the revealer and
concealer of truth. Yet even in The Winter’s Tale, which in contrast to the later play requires
suspension of our disbelief at its representation of time, an oracular voice plays a central role in
(not quite the action, but) the world of the play. The work’s expressions of wonder at strangeness
and distance are most notably given by Cleomenes and Dion in a scene that seems to foreshadow
The Tempest and the situation of its characters. Read in comparison to the later play, The
Winter’s Tale can make clear the function and fascination of a larger and less human memory (as
feigned by the Harpy, and as represented by the oracle), as well as show what The Tempest gains
in its much different presentation of time.
After Leontes’ imprisonment of Hermione and Camillo’s flight from court, Leontes admits
that he could use more than only circumstantial evidence to proceed in his accusations. He tells
us that he has sent Cleomenes and Dion to Delphos for the purpose of obtaining “a greater
confirmation.” Upon the coming revelation hangs “th’event o’th’journey:”
Now from the oracle
They will bring all, whose spiritual counsel had
Shall stop or spur me.
II.i.187-9

The impartiality of these lines is feigned, however, and the king is arrogant enough to suppose
that the oracle’s judgment will second his own. Though at first he does not project his own
prejudice onto the oracle and tries to at least appear as though he is rationally proceeding in his
accusation of his queen, deferring to a more expansive knowledge before his own, immediately
after he asserts that the journey is being made only to persuade certain skeptics, not himself: “I
am satisfied, and need no more / Than what I know.” He at once draws our attention to the
crucial power of the oracle’s “spiritual counsel” and declares it irrelevant to him.
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Cleomenes and Dion are absent for twenty-three days; we never witness their encounter with
the oracle or the dwellers on Delphos, and only hear of it second-hand, in a brief, remarkable
scene which is the direct precursor of The Tempest II.i and III.iii. That the encounter on Delphos
is not explicitly shown is key to the significance of the scene; the strangeness and wonder in
what the two have witnessed can only be relayed to us in the form of a traveler’s tale, a
transmission across distance just as the oracle’s message is ostensibly relayed to her from
someplace else, farther removed.
CLEOMENES

The climate’s delicate, the air most sweet;
Fertile the isle, the temple much surpassing
The common praise it bears.

DION

I shall report,
For most it caught me, the celestial habits—
Methinks I so should term them—and the reverence
Of the grave wearers. O, the sacrifice—
ceremonious, solemn, and unearthly
It was i’th’off’ring!

CLEOMENES

But of all, the burst
And the ear-deaf’ning voice o’th’oracle,
Kin to Jove’s thunder, so surprised my sense
I was nothing.
III.i.1-11

The temple of Delphos, on its distant island, is already the subject of travelers’ tales before we
hear of it ourselves; its “common praise” is known in Sicilia, but the two messengers find
something about it which is not done justice by those reports. To begin on a comparative level,
the observations which Cleomenes opens with are the same with which Gonzalo, in his genuine
but perhaps overblown optimism, will praise Prospero’s island. The climate is delicate: “though
this island seem to be desert—uninhabitable, and almost inaccessible—it needs must be of subtle,
tender, and delicate temperance;” and the air is sweet: “the air breathes upon us here most
sweetly.” There is no skeptic Sebastian or Antonio present to mock Cleomenes and Dion’s
wonder, which increases its effect on us, the audience; we are not distracted by the statements of
wonder being used as the butt of jokes and can weigh them ourselves. For that matter, Gonzalo’s
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declarations, however overzealous, are no less earnest or marvelous than his counterparts’ in The
Winter’s Tale; he is indeed the witness to miracles, not least of which is the preservation of the
lives of himself and his fellows.
Next, the inhabitants of the island are recalled in a way that intriguingly masks their nature.
What catches Dion is not the figures themselves, but aspects of them: what they wear, and their
reverence. The wonder is compounded by what is not said: there is no mention of what these
ministers of Delphos actually are. The recollection is segmented into “features” which have
individually made an imprint in memory, similar to Miranda’s anatomization of her memory in
III.i. Phrased the way it is, Dion’s recollection seems to be of nonhuman beings: their habits are
celestial, their sacrifice unearthly; the ceremony is strange and not completely intelligible while
hinting at a greater intelligence, awesome and alien and worthy of such reverence. The
Neapolitans feel a similar sense of awe at the apparition of the “several strange shapes” which
bring in the false feast, which they take without question to be native inhabitants: “certes, these
are people of the island.” (III.iii.30)
As we’ve seen, this unexpected encounter serves to verify, to Antonio at least, all other
fantastic travelers’ tales. The figures themselves, if not “solemn” as the inhabitants of Delphos,
nonetheless seem to communicate without “the use of tongue,” producing what Alonso
remarkably terms “a kind / Of excellent dumb discourse.” Both parties feel, in their wonder, the
impulse to storytell; they frame their experience in terms of relating it to the inexperienced: “If in
Naples / I should report this now...” begins Gonzalo, as Dion’s first words are the resolute “I
shall report...” There is a constant process of “furthering;” we can see how the temple’s
description is distanced from us as we are shown everything in reverent detail except the
“wearers” themselves.
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Lastly, what are we to make of Cleomenes’ account of hearing the voice of the oracle? Like a
clap of thunder, it overpowers his faculties just as Alonso stands dumbstruck by the voice of the
Harpy, which he interprets as thunder itself. To the king, the voice is a natural force intoning
human words, namely “the name of Prosper.” To Cleomenes, the voice is, by its power to
stupefy and amaze, akin to an element of the divine and imbued with a similar sort of wisdom.
The effect of the voice on its hearers is related to that characteristic power of Prospero’s art, that
of “spell-stopping,” of rendering the victim immobile through the power of speech. Cleomenes’
admission that the oracle “so surprised my sense / That I was nothing” is a more compact
summary of this phenomenon that anything in The Tempest. To Leontes’ messengers, the entity
they have gone to consult is not inimical to them, though it is certainly terrifying; they do not
discover its power through willfully raising their swords against it and finding themselves
“charmed,” as Ferdinand, Alonso, and the others do. They submit to its power, which
overwhelms them both physically (acting upon their “sense”) as well as metaphysically (by the
revelation of its divine nature). When Semon writes of the minor characters in The Winter’s Tale
that “their wonder is our wonder”61 it is because we, as audience, stand as far removed from
Cleomenes and Dion as they do from the miraculous things they describe.
The awe of the oracle lies in the sense that its memory is more expansive, less earthly than
that of man, perhaps the memory of the gods themselves. Its authority derives at the very first
from the strangeness of its revelation. It approximates the effect of the “unexpected encounters”
we have discussed, except the gap that it bridges is not spatial or temporal but seemingly from
one plane to another—all the more striking because unlike a transmission across earthly
boundaries of space and time, the properties and function of memory are different on either end
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of the exchange. The transaction is so disturbing in its effect on human memory because human
memory itself is not a factor, not applicable, to whatever power lies behind the oracle.
Yet the immense knowledge it possesses is not immediately accessible. The great store of
memory (if memory is even the right term) the oracle contains is sealed, not only in its cryptic
nature but more practically, in the means of its transmission. Cleomenes has heard the voice of
the oracle but does not know the message that he has been entrusted to carry. Like Miranda, he is
aware that some truth lies behind the gap in his knowledge, and that a time will come about
suitable for that information to be revealed. The revelation will be strange and new: “rare” is the
word reiterated in the scene. Dion concludes:
When the oracle,
Thus by Apollo’s great divine sealed up,
Shall the contents discover, something rare
Even then will rush to knowledge.
III.i.18-21

The oracular message, literally sealed, is not the voice that issued from the temple and surprised
Cleomenes’ sense but rather the written judgment sealed and soon to be opened which will make
sense of the voice.62 Indeed, the phenomenon of concealed knowledge in these last plays is
linked closely with writing, both figuratively or in fact.
We have considered how storytellers (and any figure with a message to transmit) command
attention and authority by the power of their voice, even if the account they give is lacking in
external verification or corroboration. Yet written accounts and messages in print seem to
fascinate characters in the last plays because they are separated from individual men and women
in a way that speech cannot be, and because of that separation suggest a connection to the idea of
a higher and greater memory, a memory that in Ariel’s words will delay, not forget. Because
62
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can understand, and then seal the message for delivery to the inquirer.
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print is not subject to the forces that affect human speakers, it holds an appearance of greater
durability; out of that real or imagined strength, what it lacks in vocal power it makes up for in
its appearance of authority and objectivity even if it has neither.63 The originator of a message in
print is not as instantly apparent in, not as bound up in, the message itself as is the speaker of
words. Because of this degree of distance between source and text, the source is sometimes
presumed to be of greater authority than the recipient, or any other figure. This tendency is
demonstrated clearly in an exchange from Richard III (which Wilson Knight uses as his preface
to his essay on Cymbeline):
PRINCE

Did Julius Caesar build [the Tower], my lord?

BUCKINGHAM He did, my gracious lord, begin that place,
Which since succeeding ages have re-edified.
PRINCE

Is it upon record, or else reported
Successively from age to age, he built it?

BUCKINGHAM Upon record, my gracious liege.
III.i.69-74

Whether or not due to the immaturity of the young prince, he perceives a real distinction between
“report” and “record,” written history and oral legend, verification and “aura.” The
misconception is that documentation is simply another form of report, though its possible
longevity, greater than that of speech, makes it possible for a written document to step out of
time and confront the present as a physical trace of the past. In this tradition, it is not surprising
that in the same dialogue in Aeneid 1 which we have already considered (and in Kott’s judgment
is a model for The Tempest), Jupiter declares to Venus before calming her anxieties about the
predestined future uoluens fatorum arcana mouebo, “I will bring about the secrets of fate,
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unrolling (as if a scroll).” The secret but somehow intelligible record of what is to come is itself
illustrated as a scroll.64
Both written and spoken information can be concealed, but the hiding of “oral” information
is dependent on the concealer. Prospero contains within himself the answers to Miranda’s
bootless inquisition, the question of “What I am,” whereas Antigonus’ scroll which answers the
question of what Perdita is must, by its physical nature, be hid outside of the self. It is too
simplistic, however, to claim that The Winter’s Tale is concerned with written messages and The
Tempest with oral/aural information, although the former play depends more heavily on the
device in the course of its action, be it the oracle’s “rare” message or Perdita’s “marvelous”
scroll.
Writing goes hand in hand with concealment—and revelation, perhaps because concealing
print is a physical action and thus more tangible—and of more utility in metaphor—than
“holding one’s tongue” or guarding one’s words against inquisition as Prospero does.65 The
written message revealing a hidden cause is of utmost importance to the problems at hand, as
they provide both an alternative to oral retelling in the last plays as well as a contrast by which
we may see the unique perspectives of each. The impersonal nature of writing, as we’ve said,
gives it a seeming advantage in “truth” over oral accounts of the past, even if only an illusion,
but the act of reading is applied in the plays, and particularly The Winter’s Tale, to describe an
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alternative to discerning the past in oral accounts, that of reading hidden or apparent messages as
texts.
For characters intent on reading rather than hearing, the search for the truth of the past is a
search for “proof,” for the verification which Benjamin states marks epic accounts by its absence
or seeming impossibility. But characters that search for “information” rather than “tales,” over
distances perhaps impassable and perhaps not, are concerned with proof rather than with the
“aura” which surrounds and distinguishes epic accounts. If the unexpected encounter validates a
narrative of the past, it is (because unexpected) unintentional and unforeseen. Yet in
circumstances marked not by spatial or temporal distance from the matter at hand (as in The
Tempest) but by other barriers, “verification” assumes new importance—and the burden of proof,
so to speak, weighs heavier on the would-be discoverer of that truth.
“Be sure of it; give me the ocular proof,” demands Othello, because the means by which his
suspicion may be proven or disproven are more or less readily available. As a contrast to the
figures in our later two plays, he insists on viewing physical traces not because they are held over
from a now distant past but because they in part constitute the suspected action itself. What
under different circumstances commands such power among late-play characters is in the tragedy
only hearsay, not least because of the differences in the presentation of time. The two modes may
be combined: for example, in Act II of Cymbeline, the “ocular proof” of Imogen’s bracelet when
presented to Posthumus verifies a false report but is, unlike Desdemona’s handkerchief,
transported across a great expanse of space. In turn, the handkerchief itself does not on its own
prove or disprove Othello’s mysterious tale of its origin; the object itself is not corroboration of
any account, and the story’s veracity remains uncertain, even as the object’s wonder and the
story’s strangeness are magnified.
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The significance of all these objects-as-texts to the characters who would, through them,
discern the truth of the past lies in the degree to which the message they bear is concealed or
disclosed. Prospero’s robes, when considered in context, bear within themselves an account of
his past; his decision to “discase me and myself present / As I was sometime Milan” makes clear
to his audience his identity and, at least in part, the narrative of how both he and the robes came
to be where they are. But the significance is only apparent to an audience that has the necessary
knowledge to receive it, as the Neapolitans do. Some other physical artifact of the past, for
instance one of Prospero’s books, may not inherently proclaim the narrative one might ascribe to
it. Of course, objects that consist of actual writing, and their degrees of “transparency,” are much
easier to classify in this scheme, as they are quite literally either sealed or open. But all these
objects are important because they are at least perceived to be authoritative by being part of what
we might call the “memory of things” or the memory of the world an inhuman, inanimate record
not subject to the failures or deficiencies of human memory and, though able to decay in some
ways, more in line with the “properties of divinity” than any human record. In the dialogue from
Richard III cited above, Prince Edward goes on to hypothesize a type of this greater inhuman
record in which things proclaim their own truth of themselves—and in which the message is
easily legible:
But say, my lord, it were not registered,
Methinks the truth should live from age to age,
As ‘twere retailed to all posterity
Even to the general all-ending day.
III.i.75-8

But yet another possible misconception on the prince’s part is the assumption that the truth,
while present, is easily interpreted—that all truths in objects are recorded in like terms and
translated with facility from one medium to the next.
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If the world of objects is supposed to possess this “memory of nature,” The Winter’s Tale, in
conjunction with the Sonnets, offers an interesting perspective on the human body as one of
these objects, encoding a message. (The external, tangible aspect of the body is what we are
dealing with here, not the internal faculties of memory and recall.) In II.iii, Paulina fights her
way into Leontes’ court with the newborn (and as yet unnamed) Perdita to make the case that the
child is indeed legitimate. Her evidence, the ocular proof, is Perdita’s features which resemble
the king’s so closely. As Macbeth does to Sweno, she “confront[s] him with self-comparisons.”
(I.ii.81) Her metaphor is that of a written message, which will come to the fore in the following
scene featuring Cleomenes and Dion which we have already considered.
Behold, my lords,
Although the print be little, the whole matter
And copy of the father: eye, nose, lip,
The trick of’s frown, his forehead, nay, the valley,
The pretty dimples of his chin and cheek, his smiles,
The very mould and frame of hand, nail, finger.66
II.iii.98-103

Paulina’s language carries the metaphor of the body-as-text: Perdita’s collective features are the
“matter” of the text, and its content is a copy, an exact tracing of her father’s features. Not only is
Perdita figured as a text in the metaphor, her presence as evidence is an invitation to “read” her.
She, though human, personifies what we have tentatively called the memory of nature, as
completely spontaneously, unwilled, she proclaims of herself her own origin, like one’s own
signature proclaims itself by the fact of its existence.
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Paulina is not finished with her metaphor; she continues, shifting the figure into an opportunity to attack
Leontes’ jealousy:
And thou, good goddess Nature, which hast made it [Perdita’s appearance]
So like to him that got it, if thou hast
The ordering of the mind too, ‘mongst all colors
No yellow in’t!
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The comparison becomes more interesting in epic terms when we realize that one’s own birth
is the ultimate hidden cause, the absolute point past which one cannot observe but the results of
which enable the present to come to be. It is not a coincidence that, as we’ve seen in Chapter 2,
Wilder associates The Tempest’s “backward and abysm” with Miranda’s conception (consciously
or not) of her own birth and the darkness that preceded it.67
Paulina’s method in her scene before Leontes is similar in both rhetoric and metaphor to that
of the “procreation sonnets” (1-17). The addressee is begged to produce an heir, whose features
will “call back” those of the Fair Youth, both physically and in memory. Not only will the child
exist to preserve what the speaker admires in the addressee, the child’s features will serve as a
proof of his parentage and a record of the past; the truth of his origin will be recorded, as in a text,
in the child’s face, a better mode of recording than the poet’s lines since it is imitative (even
photographic, as Sonnets such as 4 would have us believe) and not descriptive.
Indeed, the child will be living “verification.” It will perform the function of recording not
just as well as but better than the poem itself. “You should live twice,” writes the speaker of
Sonnet 17, “in [some child of yours], and in my rhyme,” while his words unassisted are subject
to the scorn of skeptics and liable to be “termed a poet’s rage.” In the expected devaluing of
words by “the age to come” we can see a difference between actually or seemingly divinely
inspired words-as-text (i.e. the voice of the oracle) and words that, unconnected to higher
authority, can be held to have little or no value.68 This latter sort are those of “the lunatic, the
lover, and the poet,” whose characteristic function is to break down and combine “features”
under the guidance of Fancy rather than of Reason (see Chapter 1, note 23). Even if the poet’s
67

Wilder, 178.
This is the potential fate that awaits the words of Sonnet 60’s speaker as quoted above, though the scorn of
unbelievers is not an element of the poem, which includes the metapoetic reference to “my verse” only at the couplet
and does not, as Sonnet 17 does, propose it at the outset (“Who will believe my verse in time to come?”) and then
alternate between idea and revision (“But were some child…”)
68

78
aspiration is like the storyteller’s to strive for the goal of universal perspective that Quinones
describes, the body as physical evidence provides the desired validation. The desired ability to
see what was within what is prevalent among many more of the sonnets than just the set
mentioned here (e.g. LIX and LXV), even if the tone becomes ironic as the speaker draws the
line between the record of “former days” (59.14) and the observable evidence that confronts him
now.
Is this idea of an oracular voice a sort of solution to the problems of conflicting memories
and expectations in the last plays? Can it bring light to the “dark backward and abysm?” More
specifically to The Tempest, can we find this sort of a presence in a play with no unambiguous
representation of supernatural intervention or revelation? Prospero deals only with “weak
masters” who, after all, report to him; he does not commune with higher forces or the terrifying
“powers” that he instructs Ariel to speak of as the harpy. There are no scenes, or reported scenes,
of revelation by a figure in contact with the gods (and the only deity referred to in more than
generic oath-terms is Setebos, by Caliban only). The latent “record of things,” if not impossibly
concealed, seems to hold a key to determining the nature of the truth of the past. Yet perhaps that
presence of an authoritative voice in contact with “the properties of divinity” is simply the
dominating figure in this play and others—that is, the figure by whose conditions all the others
must operate. If the island has become a grounds on which Prospero exercises both desired and
realized domination, then his voice, as much as any other, will provide the terms on which the
past is remembered—and beyond which any definition of historical accuracy means little. This
situation would be in accord with the nature of the island as distant and thus unreachable by
external influence; it would also mean that any figure with sufficient power relative to his
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fellows to appear oracular or in control of revealed knowledge would fulfill that function within
the world of the play just as well as an authentic oracle (provided that one is a possibility at all).
Prospero, then, aspires to be the oracle of the world of his play, to link himself to the sort of
proposed higher system of memory that is the desire of storytellers—if not to possess or embody
that memory himself. Such lapses in his recall as the nearly catastrophic one in Act IV hinder his
attempts to profess such authority, yet Semon has noted that he comes to hold an accordingly
exalted position at least in relation to the play’s other characters. Semon rightly notes that
Prospero “functions as the visions and oracles of the preceding plays had,” and plays the same
part as the oracle in The Winter’s Tale, who is, for all the weight accorded to its voice, absent
from the action. (The absence is the penultimate play is not problematic, however; it is simply a
difference in technique and structure. The Winter’s Tale stages its distances by absence from the
stage, while in The Tempest the action takes place, strange though it may sound, at the heart of
distance. Drawing a sharp distinction between the two is not entirely necessary, though, as the
vast differences in the presentation and usage of space between the two plays turn any such
consideration into a comparison of dissimilar terms.)
To return to Semon’s theory, Prospero appears to his several foils, particularly the king’s
party, to have the status of the oracle even if he does not possess such status in fact (disregarding
the question, as we’ve discovered above, of the possibility or existence of that status to begin
with). Such an appearance is more easily attained due to the belief of the less skeptical
Neapolitans, most notably Gonzalo, in the existence of such an authority. When Prospero reveals
what he knows of each member of the king’s party while they stand spell-stopped in V.i, the
skeptics Sebastian and Antonio are forced to confront the possibility of this miraculous
knowledge, though they respond by muttering “The devil speaks in him” (131) rather than
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calling, as Alonso and Gonzalo do, upon “some heavenly power” (107). Echoing the wonder of
Cleomenes and Dion at a marvelous message both imminent and concealed, Prospero plays his
part as arbiter of memory and history by assuring Alonso that he holds the answers, but will
delay their revelation. In fact, he holds the king’s party to the same anticipating ignorance in
which Miranda dwelt (though content) for so long, desiring that “more to know...[not] meddle
with [their] thoughts:”
No more yet of this,
For ‘tis a chronicle of day by day,
Not a relation for a breakfast, nor
Befitting this first meeting.
V.i.164-7

This is the same response as his terse breaking-off of his narrative to Miranda, “Here cease more
questions.” Later in V.i, as Semon notes, Prospero answers directly in the voice of an oracle
when Alonso calls for one:
ALONSO

Some oracle
Must rectify our knowledge.

PROSPERO

Sir, my liege,
Do not infest your mind with beating on
The strangeness of this business. At picked leisure,
Which shall be shortly, single I’ll resolve you,
Which to you shall seem probable, of every
These happened accidents: till when, be cheerful
And think of each thing well.
V.i.247-254

And as befits such a role, Prospero’s response in the voice of the oracle is to defer revelation to
another later moment, not far off and fast approaching, when what now would seem strange will
make sense and appear “probable” in the context of both the past and the crisis together. It is in
the context, and under the sway, of such seemingly absolute memories that the Harpy’s
characterization of the “powers”—“delaying, not forgetting”—takes on its terrifying force, and
through which Prospero at last exerts his power over the Neapolitans, even if the exchange
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appears amicable on the surface.69 Antonio, as we’ve noticed, mutters that Prospero’s “oracular”
power is diabolical—even as Prospero withholds the information he could disclose about the
attempt on Alonso’s life, yet another act of concealment by the figure who has the potential to
reveal all:
But you, my brace of lords, were I so minded,
I here could pluck his highness’ frown upon you
And justify you traitors. At this time
I will tell no tales.
V.i.128-31

Prospero follows the advice of Lear’s fool to “have more than thou showest” and “speak less
than thou knowest,” in part to maintain the upper hand in his relationship with Antonio,
essentially using the latter’s seeming fellowship with Alonso as a hostage. But apart from those
considerations of his political motives, he maintains his authoritative status by appearing to be
able to reveal the truth and yet not making it known. This is a boon to those whom the truth once
revealed would put on the wrong side of power, but it is also a tactic of the magus to intimidate
and prompt in the conspirators the question of what else he holds mentally concealed but is not
inclined to disclose.
Prospero’s great act of revelation in the final scene is his “discovery” of Ferdinand and
Miranda, which enacts spatially, and demonstrates visually, his attempt at playing the master of
memory, the man who “brings forth wonders.” The physical revelation of the lovers is in perfect
69

Some might object to this statement by asserting that the deferral of the recapitulation of Prospero’s account
is simply a device to conclude the play since we as spectators have already heard the tale in I.ii and, at any rate, the
action is nearing its end. One taking this view would point to the large number of other plays in the canon, especially
the other late plays, in which similar passages are spoken near the conclusion of the final scene. These are the same
sort of skeptics who would deny the importance accorded to the scenes of retelling in I.ii as no more than an excuse
for exposition. But however common a type of passage seems to be to other plays of similar genre, it must be judged
in its own context. The unique time-scale of The Tempest is more than enough to grant this passage its own
significance, different from the seemingly similar concluding speeches in Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter’s Tale,
The Comedy of Errors, and so on.
On another note, one might recall by way of this passage the awe, under the pretense of lightheartedness,
experienced by the ladies of Cleopatra’s court when Charmian encounters the oracular Soothsayer with the
wonderfully understated question, “Is it you, sir, that know things?” (Antony and Cleopatra, I.ii.7)
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opposition to the concealment of self-knowledge from Miranda that Prospero had perpetuated
since she was able to conceive the relevant questions. This unveiling is a late step in the process
Prospero has undertaken over the play’s duration; he transitions from playing a concealer and
revealer simply of knowledge and language to performing the same functions but with regard to
human interactions. From the perspective of Alonso and the Neapolitans, the rediscovery of
Ferdinand is, at least at first, a resurrection from the dead, a seeming instance of the “rough
magic” that Prospero had pledged to abjure just one hundred lines before.
Like Paulina, who before she reveals the false statue of Hermione attempts to deceive her
audience into believing that she is practicing necromancy, Prospero maintains an appearance. He
keeps up a disguise, aided by the wonder and terror of those he is trying to convince. It works
well in Act V of The Tempest, but as a condition of the play’s extraordinary time-structure we
cannot see beyond its end, no more than we can see beyond our own present. There is no telling
what will become of Prospero after the return to Milan, and he seems himself to harbor no high
hopes about an existence in which “every third though shall be [his] grave.” The properties of his
domain on the island—its distances—that allow him to maintain the semblance of an arbiter of
memory will no longer accompany him—a change symbolized, most clearly, by the departure of
Ariel, the penultimate action in the play. All that remains is a final speech-act, one not of
retelling or recalling, but of uncertainty in the future—a plea. The final action of the drama is,
finally, an opening to the spectators of the play’s world, or the opening of the world of the
spectators to Prospero—it can be phrased either way, because over the course of the drama, its
characters who retell and remember have made it clear to us that the two worlds are in the end
the same. The illusion of the play will dissolve, and we will be left, as Prospero reminds us,
without a trace—able only to recall it through equally insubstantial images of memory, unless,
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like Aeneas, we have recognized ourselves on the temple wall, and seen ourselves reflected in a
substance more enduring.
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